

THE SOCIO-CULTURAL AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE ECONOMIC SUCCESS OF THE CHINESE IN THE PHILIPPINES*

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Introduction

From the barren hills of Fujian and Guangdong to the corporate boardrooms of Makati; from crude sweatshops to huge commercial complexes; from the barefoot vendors in tattered clothing to owners of state-of-the-art megamalls; from illiterate peasants to prominent professionals – the Chinese in the Philippines have indeed come a long, long way.

Behind these triumphs, however, were the silent years of hardships and struggles; of blood, sweat, and tears that brought them to where they or at least where their children are today. While some of the poignant stories of the early immigrants have been documented, they are focused mostly on the success stories. What few people realize is that for every success story, there are more untold stories of failures and heartbreaks. They have remained

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undocumented because the Chinese will be that last to remember or record incidents where they lose face. While we dissect the role of the Chinese in the Philippine economy in academic forums, it would also be worthwhile to recall the many untold stories behind each economic success that is presented.

The same economic success that threw the ethnic Chinese minority into prominence also brought them the envy and resentment of the majority in mainstream society. The early immigrant Chinese paid a high price to achieve economic success, they and their children are once again paying a high price for this same success. The incidences of kidnapping that targeted the Chinese,¹ the recent moves against big businesses, especially the ethnic Chinese-owned ones, and the tax evasion examinations singling out prominent Chinese *taipans*² are disturbing indicators that latent racism, which has never been far from the surface, is rearing its ugly head again. While these events may not all be racially motivated, the fact that the ethnic Chinese have been singled out as a sector to be the targets of such actions is widely perceived as a manifestation of undercurrents of racism.

No less than the National Security Adviser of the Philippines, General Jose Almonte, in a recent interview with *Asiaweek*, said that “the country should not be a milking cow of the Chinese.”³ In a forum before the Philippine Congress last September, General Almonte was quoted by media as saying: “The insurgency problem is not in the Sierra Madres of Quezon and Luzon provinces but in the boardrooms of Makati and Binondo where these titans plan out the conquest and total control of the country’s socio-economic and political power.”⁴ (Binondo is the heart of ethnic Chinese commerce and finance while Makati is the business center of Spanish-Filipino elites.)

This paper attempts to present the socio-cultural and political dimensions of the economic success of the ethnic Chinese in the Philippines. First, the paper points out lessons from the past to show that racial discrimination has never worked and, in fact, has

often created unexpected backlash that harms both the minority sector and the mainstream society of which the former is an integral part. Following this, the paper examines the socio-cultural dimensions of economic success by pointing out the conflicts in the Filipino and Chinese relationships. Misunderstanding of the true role of the Chinese Filipinos in the Philippine economy leads to the erroneous conclusion that the success of the minority sector is prejudicial to the success of the majority.

Finally, the paper explores the political position of the ethnic Chinese vis-à-vis their economic status. Using the kidnapping menace as an illustration, the paper discusses how the Chinese community responded to the problem. The weakness in the political position of the Chinese community and their initial hesitancy in taking part in any action that is interpreted as political in nature led to the indifference of government officials in helping to solve the problems. Only when the majority and the minority finally joined forces to act concertedly on the problem was the kidnapping menace at least abated if not eradicated.

Learning from the Past

Anti-Chinese discriminatory policies have been resorted to officially since Spanish times especially whenever government needed a scapegoat for its economic ills. However, history has also taught that never had such policies worked. The backlash of anti-Chinese discriminatory measures often created more serious problems for the country.⁵

The Spanish government's policy towards the Chinese depended on the degree of their fears and the degree of their need for the services of the local Chinese. After the big massacre experienced by the Chinese in 1603 and in 1639, when almost the entire Chinese population was wiped out, the colonial economy

experienced a virtual standstill. This occurred after every incident of mass expulsion too. The colonial masters learned that while they hated the Chinese, they also could not do without them because the Chinese traders were the indispensable backbone of their colonial economy in the Philippines. Hence, the Spanish authorities were always forced to encourage the Chinese to return after every expulsion attempt.⁶

The Americans and the Japanese, likewise, learned how to make shrewd use of the Chinese traders to serve their own ends. The Americans made use of the Chinese distribution networks to sell US-made goods and at the same time to procure native products and raw materials cheaply for export to American outlets and factories.⁷ When the Japanese Imperial Army landed in Manila, its Kempeitai targeted the local Chinese first because after all, they were deeply involved in anti-Japanese activities even before Pearl Harbor. After the initial pogroms against the Chinese, the Japanese colonials learned also that they needed the Chinese traders and their distribution networks for most of the cities' supply of basic necessities.⁸

After the war and fresh from their colonial experiences, the Filipinos equated nationalism with being anti-foreign. At that time, the local Chinese were considered an alien group and not an ethnic minority. Hence, they were the target of a number of Filipinization measures aiming to wrest supposed "Chinese control" in some areas of trade. The Chinese success in business was looked upon with envy if not with resentment. The growing role of the Chinese in the Philippine economy was seen as a competitive force, if not an inimical one, to the success of Filipino business people. This thinking gave rise to the anti-foreign (read: anti-Chinese) economic thrust such as the Filipino First Policy and the National Economic Protectionism Association.⁹

Foremost among the legislative measures adopted at the height of the Filipinization campaign was the Retail Trade Nationalization

Law, which prevented the Chinese from undertaking any form of retail trade.¹⁰ This measure was a big blow to the Chinese traders most of whom were small scale buy-and-sell business people tending the ubiquitous *sari-sari* style merchandising stores. During the initial years of its implementation, when the Filipino had not fully taken over the retail business vacuum left by the Chinese, some municipalities (especially the small ones) reported a sharp decrease in the taxes collected for the year because the Chinese who used to pay those taxes had closed shops. On the other hand, while there were reports of total failure of some Chinese business people to look for alternatives, quite a number learned to capitalize on the opportunity and went into small-scale manufacturing concerns. This became a blessing in disguise that spurred Philippine industrial growth much faster.¹¹

Another nationalization legislation is the Filipinization of the practice of professions, which had even more adverse repercussions. It effectively closed the door to an incalculable amount of human resources who could have been excellent doctors, architects, engineers, nurses, accountants, and other crucial professions much needed by a developing country. The young Chinese were forced to flock into business, the only opportunity opened to them, or else go abroad to practice their professions. It was only after the mass naturalization decree of 1975 that this situation was corrected.¹² Hence, we are now seeing a lot of Chinese names in the roster of board topnotchers.

As we have pointed out earlier, there are valuable lessons to be learned from history. One lesson is that anti-Chinese discrimination has never paid off and undercurrents of racism, unless dissipated, can explode into unfavorable situations that harm not just the ethnic Chinese but also the country of which they are an integral part. Another important lesson, on the other hand, is for the local Chinese to learn that the socio-cultural dimensions of their economic success cannot be ignored also.

Socio-Cultural Dimensions of Success

Reviewing the lessons from the past, the ethnic Chinese should learn to analyze why the present situation prevails, i.e., why must they continue to pay a price for their economic success? Weren't the sacrifices and struggles the ethnic Chinese went through in the early days enough to enable them to fully enjoy the fruits of their hardships?

In an earlier paper, I have raised the issue that Jollibee's (the biggest fast-food chain in the Philippines) hamburger, with its *langhap-sarap Pinoy*, is not less Filipino because it is owned by Tony Tan Caktiong; Mercury Drug (the biggest drugstore chain), which serves both Chinese Filipino and Filipino customers, is not less Filipino because it is owned by Mariano Que; Hapee toothpaste, which has wrested a sizable share from the toothpaste market dominated by multinationals, is not less Filipino because it is owned by Cecilio Sy Pedro; and so on. But, unfortunately, this fact is not yet fully accepted as truth.¹³

To a certain extent, the concept of the Chinese as an ethnic and not an alien minority has not yet taken hold. While they have progressed economically, a full acceptance of the local Chinese as an integral part of Philippine society is still elusive. Hence, growth in the Chinese sector of the Philippine economy is not yet perceived as growth in the domestic economy.

Until mainstream society accepts the ethnic Chinese minority fully as co-equal partners in economic development, the "*kayo* (you) vs. *kami* (us)" mentality will prevail – meaning, the Chinese's success in Philippine business is translated as a challenge or competition to the native population's own success if not outrightly the reason for the business failure of Filipinos. Likewise, the Chinese's share of the domestic economic pie is interpreted as the lessening or shrinking of the Filipino's share of the pie.

Moreover, because Chinese-Filipino business people are not considered part of the mainstream, they cannot fully enjoy the

benefits of their economic success while the majority of the Filipinos live below the poverty line. This is illustrated by the fact that while the success of Filipino business people (including the Spanish-Filipino elite) is accepted naturally, that of the Chinese is often viewed not just with envy and resentment but also seen as prejudicial to the native population's success.

This situation is dangerous and volatile because during times of political or social unrest, history tells us that it is often the minority that is sacrificed. We have learned, however, that, under the circumstances, it is not only the Chinese minority who will suffer but the majority even more.

Political Dimension

Another dimension of the economic success of the ethnic Chinese to consider is their political acceptance. While the local Chinese have enjoyed unprecedented economic growth in the last two decades, there has been no parallel growth in their political strength. In a previous paper on political participation and political integration, I pointed out that the ethnic Chinese can have more meaningful participation in the socio-economic development of the country only if they achieve full political integration.¹⁴

Unless the local Chinese learn to stand firm as full-fledged citizens of the Philippines, willing and able to fight and speak up for their rights and demand attention to their problems, then they cannot always claim the just rewards of their economic endeavors.

The economic position of the ethnic Chinese will continue to be fragile without concomitant political backing. Political backing is taken here not in terms of patronage from Filipino politicians but in terms of strengthening their political position vis-à-vis their rising economic status. Without a stronger political base, real economic growth will not be easy to achieve because there will always be hindrances, deliberate impediments, or harassments.

Likewise, problems besetting the local Chinese community will be seen only as narrow parochial concerns of the ethnic Chinese, and not as problems that will affect national society and may, in fact, have great impact on Philippine economy.

The political weakness is reflected clearly in the community's response to the kidnapping problem as well as the government's treatment of the same. There are more than a thousand "Chinese" organizations in the country but due to the traditional orientation of most of these groups, the leadership failed or refused to make use of organized action to make the community's demand felt. In fact, some of the traditionally minded leaders in the community still persist in thinking that they live in a "foreign land" so they have to be wary about taking any action that can be interpreted as political in nature. Under such circumstances, the local Chinese should not complain that they are being treated as second class citizens in this country.

The kidnapping menace, which badly traumatized the local Chinese, revealed the ineffective and lack of power of the traditional leadership in the community. Many of the leading traditional organizations used the old ways of meeting and discussing the problem with the top-ranking government officials who often demanded logistics or financial support for solving the problem. These organizations usually gave in to what the government official demanded and provided equipment, transportation, financial help, and other logistical support. Unfortunately, such methods have proved ineffective in solving the kidnapping problem and restoring peace and order.¹⁵

Kidnapping continued to mercilessly claim victims and even lives despite government pronouncements that there was an abatement of the problem. At one point, right after the 1992 elections and the Ramos government was sworn in, kidnapping incidents were happening once every other day. Events came to a head in September 1992, when two young students, Kenneth Go and Myron Ramos Uy, were killed. The vulnerability of the

Chinese community was never more evident in this gruesome crime. First of all, the abduction happened in Chinatown itself. Secondly, the ransom payment did not ensure the safety of the victims' lives. Thirdly, the victims were tortured before they were killed. Lastly, Go belonged to a low-key middle-class family while Uy's father is a low-salary employee. This incident shocked the Chinese community and finally galvanized it into action.¹⁶

The Chinese community was so agitated that it proposed a temporary school closure and business strike to dramatize their demands for action on the kidnapping problem. Younger groups suggested the organization of "vigilante" or self-defense clubs for protection. Although the proposed school and business strikes did not materialize due to interference by conservative groups and pro-Taiwan groups, the public uproar and media mileage the events elicited finally helped to call attention to the problem. To a great extent, the events also led to the isolation of traditional organizations. The leading organization, the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry Inc. (FFCCCCI), was at the receiving end of public indignation for its failure to lead the community into taking mass action. Adding insult to injury was the fact that the FFCCCCI even expressed publicly that their members have confidence in the way the government is dealing with the problem.¹⁷ The helplessness of the traditional leadership was revealed while the Chinese community learned the lesson that the age-old practice of solving problems through the so-called *guo min waijiao* (国民外交) or political patronage no longer works.

Following the death of the two students in September 1992 was the death of yet another high school student, Charlene Maine Sy, on January 7, 1993. It was the catalyst that finally moved the Chinese community into mass action. Members of the community could no longer be complacent and their impatience over past inactions could no longer be contained. It was, therefore, not difficult for Kaisa Para Sa Kaunlaran, a newer

and smaller organization made up of younger Chinese Filipino members, to spearhead a mass funeral rally. The Movement for the Restoration of Peace and Order was formed by mobilizing community organizations to participate in the funeral march. The cooperation from the erstwhile unacquainted groups was unprecedented. During Sy's funeral, many Chinese schools were closed and students were sent to join the funeral march. Most business establishments in Chinatown area also closed down for the day. Even the automotive supplies establishments along Banawe Street in Quezon City, which used to open 365 days a year, closed shops that morning to participate in the mass action. More than 25,000 people from all sectors and all walks of life joined the mass funeral rally in sympathy with the Sy family. It was a significant milestone in Philippine Chinese history.¹⁸

Closely following the mass funeral was another significant breakthrough in the history of Filipino and Chinese relations. For the first time, Filipinos and Chinese Filipinos joined forces in an unprecedented historic mass action. A mass rally was spearheaded by the Filipino middle class through a multisectoral aggrupation called Citizen Action Against Crime (CAAC). It was held on February 16, 1993, to coincide with the closing ceremonies at the First National Summit on Peace and Order held at the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC) in Manila. While the government-sponsored multi-sectoral summit was being held inside the PICC; outside, more than 100 organizations, a large percentage of which came from the Chinese community, were mobilized to express their anger and protest against rising criminality and the unabated kidnapping. Even the more conservative traditional organizations in the Chinese community sent their representatives and identified their groups as participants in the rally.¹⁹

The PICC rally shows, above all, that the Chinese community alone cannot solve a problem of such magnitude. The community needs the strength of the majority, the people behind CAAC, to

really prod the masses into action and get the government's full attention. It especially called attention to the fact that the destiny of the Chinese community is closely tied with the majority. The kidnapping menace, being a national problem, can be solved and faced only together with the Filipino people. Likewise, another significant lesson that the Chinese community learned was that only when they stand firm on their identity as Filipinos and are willing to speak up, articulate their own problems, fight for their rights, and work together with the majority can there be hope that the problem will be minimized if not completely solved.

The mass action produced effective results. The President ordered the total revamp of the Philippine National Police (PNP), especially its top-ranking personnel.²⁰ Kidnapping incidents, particularly in Metro Manila, drastically abated in the following months of March and April. The first recorded kidnapping of a Chinese in Metro Manila after the mass rally was on May 11, 1993, when Taiwanese national Jack Chou was kidnapped and released after payment of a PhP 10 million ransom through Hong Kong. Three other cases involving Chinese-Filipino victims were reported in June, two in July and two in September. However, while kidnappings in Metro Manila somewhat abated, it turned worse in Mindanao. In just one week, from November 8 to November 15, there were already seven victims. The last one was Charles Walton, an American researcher with the Summer Institute Linguistics.²¹

Re-examining Present Options

The kidnapping menace wreaked havoc not just in the lives of its victims but also in the Philippine economy. The economic dislocation caused by the business people who opted to close shop and move elsewhere, victims whose families moved out of the country, and domestic investors who shelved their plans for

expansion cannot be quantified. Compounding the problem is the capital flight and the hesitancy of foreign investors to come in due to the hostile business climate. Recent Philippine Central Bank figures for the first six months of 1993 showed a 434 percent increase in capital outflow compared to the same levels last year.

The economic success of the Chinese Filipinos is highly dependent on the environment. No matter how good they are supposed to be in doing business, how much they pursue good business practices, or how hardworking they are, as long as the Chinese continue to feel that their lives are being threatened because of the kidnapping problem, there would simply be no inclination for them to think of doing business, much less to think of expansion or growth. A Chinese community beset with fears cannot grow and the society of which this minority sector is a part will likewise be directly affected by the stagnation and demoralization in the Chinese business sector. The capital flight and re-migration caused by the trauma and fears spawned by kidnapping not only showed that the economic success of the Chinese cannot be protected if it is not backed by a strong political base. It also showed that the political and economic destinies of the two people are inseparable. Hence, when the Chinese community learned to join forces and work together with the mainstream society towards solving their common problems, a more viable solution was found and their fears were somewhat eased.

Now, even before the local Chinese have recovered from the trauma brought about by the kidnapping menace, which singled them out to be victims, they are currently beset by fears that the government is again singling them out as sacrificial lambs in its lackluster anti-tax evasion campaign.

First, President Fidel Ramos tried to entice the country's prominent *taipans* to form a consortium to invest in the Philippines. After the group agreed, the government hit Lucio Tan for being a Marcos crony and using his Marcos connection to build up his businesses and later on for evading taxes. Not content

with hitting Lucio Tan, the government's Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) later released a list of eight names of alleged tax evaders. Six of the names were those of the prominent *taipans* who accompanied President Ramos to his China trip and promised to form a consortium for Philippine investments.²²

Aside from the name of Lucio Tan, the list included the names of Henry Sy, John Gokongwei, Alfonso Yuchengco, George Ty, Andrew Gotianun, William Gatchalian, and Dencio Buen. Apparently, reacting to the accusation that the Chinese were being singled out in its tax campaign, the government later announced that it would also go after the tax cases of Japanese and other multinational businesses.²³ The popular conclusion in the business circle is that the administration is surrounded only by military minds who have little knowledge of economics and finance.

The government's action in singling out the prominent Chinese *taipans* as an example in its anti-tax evasion campaign elicited strong backlash in terms of adverse public opinion. Senators Blas Ople and Anna Dominique "Nikki" Coseteng hit the anti-Chinese campaign being waged by the government. Even others who find the tax evasion examinations laudable criticized the overt racism behind the move. Days after the BIR list came out, in an apparent attempt at damage control, the government first denied that it is singling out the Chinese in its tax campaign and much later on denied outright that such a BIR list, which includes the names of the *taipans*, exists.

Many local Chinese, especially the successful ones, are re-examining their options now. Many have invested in China because of the poor business climate in the Philippines in contrast to the persuasive lures of China's growing open market. Not only the much ballyhooed six *taipans* – Lucio Tan, Henry Sy, John Gokongwei, Alfonso Yuchengco, George Ty and Andrew Gotianun – have blazed a trail to China, even the middle-class business people too are making a beeline especially to their hometown, Fujian province. Philippines-based architects

like Gilbert Yu are cashing it in, being contractor-developers of properties financed by Chinese Filipinos. Garments, food, and other light industry manufacturers are starting to reap profits too. In fact, some are even more willing to try out their new ventures in Vietnam rather than in the Philippines.

China's attractive business climate is not the main reason for this transfer of investments out of the country. The power crisis is more than enough to shake one's confidence in the viability of doing business in the country. Added to that is the crisis of confidence in the government's ability to fight criminality, stop kidnapping and restore peace and order. While most business people purchased generators as temporary measures to ease the power crisis, the peace and order situation, though much better in recent months, has not yet erased the fears and the paranoia which have demoralized and driven many business people away.

Conclusion

The Philippines is at a crucial crossroad at the moment. The inconsistencies in government policies – trying to lure investments on one hand but driving away its own domestic investors on the other – have serious long-term implications which must be pointed out, especially to policy makers and planners, so that viable solutions can be found.

On the other hand, the most valuable lesson the ethnic Chinese should learn now is that the days of being mere bystanders or fence sitters are over. One cannot merely focus one's energies purely on business activities and ignore the fact that 40.6 percent of the Philippine population are living below the poverty line (1994), which does not look kindly at the perception that the Chinese belong to the better off sector of society. Even if the ethnic Chinese continue to refuse to get involved politically, politics will come knocking at their doors. They can either choose to just sit

down and accept whatever “fate” brings or choose to confront the political waves head-on. They can also either continue to isolate themselves and attempt to attend to their own concerns or choose to fully integrate themselves with mainstream society and face national concerns together. Either way, there will be great risk. However, the choice will determine the future direction of the local Chinese community – either they continue to be considered as the favorite milking cows or convenient scapegoats of politicians or they become true citizens who actively participate in determining their own future and the future of their nation.

Notes

1. See cover stories of *Tulay Chinese-Filipino Digest*, August 1992 to February 1993. See also articles by Teresita Ang See, Jacqueline Co and Go Bon Juan, *Filipinas Magazine*, January 1993, pp. 42-48.
2. “Chinese Filipinos alarmed by tax crackdown,” *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, September 30, 1993. See also other articles in *The Philippine Star*, *Manila Bulletin*, and other newspapers from September to November 1993.
3. *Asiaweek*, October 20, 1993, p. 57.
4. Philippine House of Representative. Budget Hearing, 2nd sess., 1993.
5. Antonio S. Tan. “Five Hundred Years of Anti-Chinese Prejudices,” paper presented at the Conference on “The Many Faces of Racism, Intolerance, and Prejudices,” sponsored by UNESCO and the National Historical Institute, Manila, February 1988.
6. For a description of the situation of the Chinese during the Spanish times, including the two incidents of massacres, consult Alfonso Felix Jr., *The Chinese in the Philippines 1570-1770*, vol. 1. Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1966; *Chinese in the Philippines 1770-1898*, 2 vols. Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1969.
7. See Khin Khin Myint Jensen. *The Chinese in the Philippines During the American Regime 1898-1946*. M.A. Thesis. University of Wisconsin, 1956.
8. Antonio S. Tan. *The Chinese in the Philippines During the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945*. Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1981.

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9. _____. *The Chinese in the Philippines, 1898-1935 – A Study of Their National Awakening*. Quezon City: Garcia Publishing, 1972. For the debates on the Filipino First Policy, see Schubert Liao. *Chinese Participation in Philippine Culture and Economy*. Manila: 1964.
10. Remigio E. Agpalo. "Nationalization of Retail Trade Law in the Philippines," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, vol. 5, 1961, pp. 129-143.
11. Kunio Yoshihara. *Philippine Industrialization: Foreign and Domestic Capital*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1985.
12. Teresita Ang See. "Chinese in the Philippines: Assets or Liabilities," in Teresita Ang See, ed. *The Chinese in the Philippines; Problems and Perspectives*, vol. 1. Manila: Kaisa Para Sa Kaunlaran, Inc., 1990, pp. 107-119.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Teresita Ang See. "Political Participation and Political Integration of the Chinese in the Philippines." Paper presented at the International Conference on "Changing Identities Relations: The case of the Chinese Minority," Manila, November 6-9, 1991.
15. _____. "On Kidnappings, Elections, and Political Position of the Chinese in the Philippines." Paper presented at the International Conference on "Legal, Political and Economic Status of the Chinese in the Diaspora," sponsored by the Ethnic Studies Department, University of California, Berkeley, November 26-29, 1992.
16. _____. "Kidnapping: A national disaster;" J. Co. "Anger and terror grip community;" and R. Kwan Laurel. "After the execution." *Tulay Chinese-Filipino Digest*, October 11, 1992.
17. Bong Padua and Jeffrey Tiangco. "Three more kidnaps," *People's Journal*, September 25, 1992. Antonio Macapagal. "Chinatown wants vigilantes: Mercenaries vs. kidnappers," *Manila Standard*, September 23, 1992; Gemma Luz Corotan. "A new kind of persecution," *Manila Chronicle*, September 26 to October 2, 1992. And also other news and articles on the topic, from October to December 1992.
18. Jacqueline Co and Teresita Ang See. "Note ends: Life after death," *Tulay Chinese-Filipino Digest*, February 14, 1993, pp. 8-9.
19. Jacqueline Co. "Citizens rail against crime," *Tulay Chinese-Filipino Digest*, March 8, 1993, pp. 8-9.
20. "Ramos favors mass resignation of cops," *Manila Times*, February 17, 1993. See also other papers on the same date.

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21. *The Philippines Star, Philippine Daily Inquirer*, and others, November 14 to December 7, 1993, reporting news on Charles Walton's kidnapping. He was released on December 7, 1993.
22. "Government execs defend tax campaign," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, September 17, 1993.
23. "BIR tax drive not aimed at particular group—Officials," *The Philippine Star*, September 17, 1993.