The Chinese as Filipinos

Notes on Some Contemporary Social Organizations in Manila Chinese Society

Edgar Wickberg, Ph.D.

This paper is an interim report on some aspects of my current research* on "Organizations and Ethnicity in the Chinese Population of the Philippines since 1946." In what follows I will focus upon organizations in Manila, the site of my fieldwork so far. My emphasis will be on recent developments and current conditions. I will begin with an outline of my project and a definition of some of the terms and concepts that inform it. Following that, I will discuss some of my findings to date and the questions they raise. I will conclude by presenting a trial model of socio-cultural stratification and mobility for the contemporary Philippine Chinese population.

The purpose of my project is to examine how Chinese organizations and ethnicity in the Philippines have been affected by changes in the following five variables: Philippine Chinese population movements; Philippine Chinese economic activities; the attitudes of Malay Filipinos towards people of Chinese origin in the Philippines; Philippine government policies towards Chinese in the Philippines; and relations between the Philippines and its population, on one hand, and China on the other. Members of this audience will be familiar with several of the recent changes that fit under one or more of these headings: changes in the cultural orientation of a significant sector of the Chinese population; changes in access to Philippine citizenship; changes in economic opportunities available to Chinese; changes in the character of Chinese education in the Philippines; and changes in the relationship of the Philippines to mainland China and to Taiwan.

My definition of "organizations" is broad. It includes "traditional" Chinese surname (clan) and locality (district, hometown) associations, chambers of commerce, brotherhoods, musical societies, *Hong Men* bodies, sports clubs, Lions Clubs, fire brigades, alumni associations,

schools, churches, and temples. A "Chinese" organization is any organization whose membership is predominately Chinese. By "ethnicity" I mean the mix of Chinese, Filipino, and generalized modern values and practices found in individuals within the Philippine Chinese population and in that population as a whole. In many recent writings it has become common to contrast highly acculturated Chinese descendants as "Chinese-Filipinos", meaning persons of Chinese background fully committed to the Philippines, as against "Filipino-Chinese", meaning persons who see themselves and are perceived by others to be Chinese people who happen to live in the Philippines. Although this formulation has its uses, it seems to me too simple to reflect the complexities of the problem. There are not simply two versions of Chinese ethnicity in the Philippines; there are many cultural combinations, varying with the individual, the group, the time, and the situation.

My use of the word "Chinese" is as broad as my use of "organization". I include all those residents of the Philippines who are of recent (i.e., the last few generations) Chinese inheritance and who consider themselves, or are considered by others, in some sense "Chinese". In this paper I will use the expression "Chinese society" rather than the common "Chinese community." (Skinner, 1957). "Community" implies a group with clear and strong boundaries and a considerable sense of solidarity. "Society" suggests a loosely bounded social category, parts or all of which may at times take on some of the characteristics of a community. In my conception, the Chinese population of the Philippines is made up of a rather tightly-knit "community" core, embedded in a larger, more loosely associated Chinese society. That society, in turn, is embedded (or encapsulated) (Strauch, 1981) in a larger Philippine society. I will return to this point later.

My basic position on the relationship between organizations and ethnicity is that in an ethnic minority population like that of the Chinese in the Philippines, organizations are, among other things, an indicator of ethnic expression. Thus, by studying trends in the growth, decline, or changes in activity of certain kinds of Chinese organizations we can gain some insights into the ethnicity of a given overseas Chinese society and the individuals in it. That does not mean that the more Chinese associations in a given society the more "Chinese" it is. Rather, patterns in association development may help us understand some of the *qualities* and *emphases* of Chinese ethnicity over a given time-span.

Besides being a vehicle for the expression of aspects of Chinese culture, Chinese organizations have practical, instrumental functions. The most important of these may be classified (Wickberg, 1990, 24) as: (1) negotiation within Chinese society and with outside bodies; (2) social services to members; (3) articulation and achievement of interests; (4) cultural survival and resinification (especially of younger generations). These functions serve the needs of organizations as a whole and their members as individuals. An examination of trends in organizational life in Philippine Chinese society may help us understand which functions are seen by associations and their individual members as most important at any given time.

Findings concerning organizations

The Philippine Chinese are among the most highly organized of all overseas Chinese societies. It is commonly said that there are approximately 1,000 Chinese organizations in the Philippines. Indeed, on a per capita basis, the Chinese population of the Philippines may be the most highly organized anywhere. Those 1,000 organizations serve a Chinese population of 600,000-1,000,000. There may be more organizations in, say, Singapore, but they serve a larger Chinese population. One obvious question, therefore, is: why are there so many associations in the Philippines? And, since most of them are found in Manila, we may ask the same question focused on Manila alone. A second question is: why do Chinese associations continue to proliferate in this country? We know that over the past 20-30 years substantial numbers of the younger generation of Philippine-born Chinese have been Filipinized to the extent of losing much of their language skills in Chinese, thereby bringing into question both their interest in participating in all-Chinese organizations and their linguistic capacity to do so. That, in turn, raises a third question: why are so many of the new organizations of the "traditional" Chinese type? Given the demographic and cultural trends just mentioned, we would expect this kind of organization to be rapidly fading away. Yet it shows a surprising vitality and persistence.

In attempting to address these and other questions, I have read the literature on Philippine Chinese organizations, scanned and clipped the Chinese-language daily press, collected souvenir publications of organizations, and engaged in interviews and informal conversations

with a variety of leaders and with ordinary members and informed outsiders. Given the constraints of time and my own sociological skills, I have not attempted to use survey questionnaires. It seems to me, however, that it would be a very worthwhile project if someone of long acquaintance with Chinese organizations in Manila, and familiarity with their leaders and members would attempt a social survey, focusing on why people join given organizations and how they actually participate in, or use the services of these bodies. Here, as elsewhere in this paper, I hope that the points raised may help stimulate others to formulate an agenda for research on Philippine Chinese organizations.

Although several researchers (e.g., Weightman, 1954 ff; Amyot, 1960; Omohundro, 1973 ff; Mcbeath, 1973) have discussed the subject, the detailed analysis of Chinese organizations in the Philippines really begins and ends with the writings of the late Chinben See (esp. 1976, 1981, 1988). From his works a historical analysis of recent Chinese organizational development emerges.

During the middle and late 1950s, largely in response to nationalization laws and policies of the Philippine governments of the day, and with considerable assistance from the Republic of China (Taiwan) Embassy, five organizational pyramids were created in the Chinese population. (See, 1976, 171 ff; See, 1988, 324 ff). This was done in large part by federating existing organizations into a national system. The five great hierarchies of the day were: The Federation of Chinese Chambers of Commerce, the Grand Family Association, the Chinese Schools Federation, the Federation of Guomindang Party-related associations, and the Federation of Philippine Chinese Anti-Communist Associations. The Federation of Chinese Chambers of Commerce (usually called "The Federation") functioned as an "umbrella organization", standing over and including under it the other four hierarchies, as well as its own affiliated organizations. It was (and remains today) the most powerful organization and the usual spokesman to the outside world for the Chinese population as a whole. The Grand Family Association had under it the various clan associations and, below them, the district and hometown associations. The Schools Federation drew together all Chinese school organizations in the Philippines. Similar organizational functions were performed by the Guomindang and anti-Communist federations.

The nationalization of retail trade, rice and corn dealing, and many professions drove most Chinese from these lines of work. Those financially able to do so switched their interests to wholesaling, light manufacturing, importing, and financial services. While many of these people prospered, another group of smaller scale, less-endowed businessmen found themselves alienated from the Federation, the clan associations, and other large organizations, which seemed now to be too large and too much attuned to the interests of the well-off and prestigious to be any longer of relevance to the interests and perceived needs of small businessmen and salaried employees. This group began to create smaller-scale hometown associations, brotherhoods and other associations. These bodies provided greater intimacy of relationships and thereby a greater sense of trust in the availability of mutual aid when needed. They also provided leadership opportunities to those who were unable to ascend the heights in the larger clan or hometown associations. For these reasons, the 1960s and 1970s saw a proliferation of small hometown associations, brotherhood organizations, Chinese Lions clubs and certain kinds of school alumni associations.

Simultaneously, Philippine Chinese society was becoming more complex and diverse. From the 1950s onward there were increasing numbers of families in the population and an ever larger group of Philippine-born Chinese, with new interests and perspectives. By the 1960s many in the older generation feared the possible cultural assimilation of the younger generation. Partly to forestall this and in part out of a sense of nostalgia for their now-distant and seemingly unreachable home localities in China, members of the older generation encouraged the formation of still more hometown associations.

Thus, where the 1950s were a time of organizational pyramiding in the interests of defense, the 1960s and 1970s were an era of organizational proliferation in response to the growth of Chinese society, its cultural/generational complexity, and feelings of need for smaller, more intimate organizations and more ways to revive home-locality sentiment. At the same time, the larger clan associations, musical associations, and Hong Men organizations were spinning off provincial and local branches in major cities around the country.

With the Philippines' recognition of the Beijing government in 1975 yet another factor was added. From that point on it became possible to visit mainland China and for governmental and associational exchanges to occur. This change gave rise to yet other organiza-

tions–ones favoring closer Philippine relations with China, international networking, and so on. (See, 1988, 330-331; Pacho, 1986, 83, 85).

Taking the literature just summarized as my point of departure, I have attempted to examine recent and current organizational developments, especially those since Chinben See's last publication. I have been looking for trends in new organizations, kinds of organizations, and organizational activities. I am interested in trying to explain why there are so many organizations, why so many of this or that kind of organization, and why so many "traditional" style organizations. To do this, I have attempted to look at current organizations in terms of the four analytical categories introduced earlier in this paper. I have tried to ask: do new and continuing organizations seem to respond to societal needs by performing one or more of the following functions: negotiation within Chinese society and with outside bodies; social services to members; articulation and achievement of interests; and ensuring cultural survival and resinification.

Some of my findings are as follows. (1) New associations continue to be formed. This should not be surprising. Many years ago Maurice Freedman (1967) argued that sheer growth in numbers and diversity would by itself continue to produce new associations in overseas Chinese societies. This is a reasonable proposition and one not overturned by more recent research. (2) New hometown associations continue to be established. Because of the detailed work necessary to do so, I am not yet in a position to quantify this development or analyze its nature. It appears to be a continuation of long-standing process, described by Chinben See, in which more localized home-place organizations are created, their members often being kinsmen as well as home locality-mates. (See, 1981, 227 ff; See, 1976, 148-171). (3) Besides hometown organizations, other "traditional" Chinese associations are being formed.

On this last point there are some general issues of importance. It is commonly said that "traditional" organizations in Chinatown are of interest only to "old men", and will disappear when those men die. Yet, as indicated above, these organizations continue to exist and new ones are formed. My own visits to these organizations and attendance at their formal and informal activities bears out See's statement (1988, 330) that one sees few if any persons under the age of 40 in such places. The surprising thing to me, however, is the number of men in their 40s and 50s that one sees (cf See, 1988, 328: "at least over 50 years old"). It

seems more accurate, therefore, to speak of these as "old and middle-aged mens' organizations". It also seems to me that such organizations will continue to exist and develop for some time to come. As long as immigration continues (see below), as long as Chinatown remains the focal point for certain kinds of business activity, and as long as business and certain other activities in Chinatown are facilitated by the existence of these organizations, they will continue to appeal to small and middle-level Chinatown business people. Many such associations attempt to replenish their membership and assure their future existence by attempting to attract the younger generation. This is done by forming youth committees that sponsor martial arts, sports, or other activities popular with youth. So far, the response, at least from Philippine-born young Chinese, does not seem to be very strong. (See, 1981, 236).

A fourth finding is the internationalization of many associations. (Go, 1990; *World News*, Oct. 10, 1990; See, 1981, 239). The spectrum of associations with international affiliations is extremely broad: from clan and locality organizations to Lions Clubs and alumni associations. Business networking seems to me a major reason for this development. The occasions for forming such organizational linkages include international conventions (such as the Lions), overseas migration of members (Philippine Cultural High-School's Alumni Association now has a branch in suburban Vancouver), and formal exchanges with bodies in mainland China or Taiwan. In one instance I know of, a new locality association was formed to act as host to a visiting delegation from that locality in China–but, though barely in existence, the new group was considering international linkages with its counterparts elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Besides the business networking advantages, international affiliation also lends prestige within Philippine Chinese society. These internationalizing organizations can thus be seen as a response to the internationalization of business life and their members' desire to be part of that at some level, but also as a device to strengthen the organizations' influence at home.

A fifth finding–one surprising to me–was the amount of immigration from mainland China that has come into the Philippines since 1960 and especially after 1970. Although Chinben See mentions this in some of his work (1988, 323; 333 n. 17), he does so almost in passing, rather than as a major influence on organizational development. The magnitude of this immigration–much of it illegal, at least at the outset

–is very difficult to determine. The common estimates that there are currently between 50,000 and 100,000 "illegals" in the Philippines, most of them Chinese, may be of some help. The main point is that the Chinese immigration tap has never really been turned off in the Philippines. That fact, in itself, helps explain much of the persistence of "traditional" Chinese associations in Manila. The newcomers arrive in Manila and stay there. They lack the Philippine linguistic and cultural skills to move into Philippine society as a whole. But they possess in abundance those same skills in Chinese form. Some of them have thereby revitalized the Chinese newspapers and the Chinese-language literary scene. Others occupy such low-visibility positions as restaurant dishwasher and temple caretaker. Still others form at least some part of that corps of 40 and 50 year olds, conspicuous in leadership ranks of "traditional" associations today. Thus, the future of such associations does not rest only upon the level of interest of Philippine-born youth; it also depends on the continuation of the Hokkien immigration link.

That link has an intermediate connection: the North Point district of Hong Kong. So far as I know, the anthropologist Gregory Guldin (1977) is the only person who has studied the Hokkien community of North Point and its connections with the Amoy-Quanzhou area on the one hand and Manila on the other. A common pattern of migration has been for people from the "home" districts in Fujian to visit their relatives in North Point, staying there until it is possible for them to go on to their relatives in Manila.

The existence of this particular immigration network helps us understand why it is one sees almost no 20-year olds in Manila's "traditional" Chinese associations. These associations are not meant to help youthful newcomers get started on arrival; it is their own kinsmen and home-townsmen, already in Manila, who do that. Association membership is likely to come later and, indeed, *formation* of a new association may be a kind of benchmark–an indication that some one-time new immigrants have now "established" themselves in Manila.

Whether this kin-assisted way of getting established is something realtively new–since the 1960s say–and whether it is a replacement for earlier methods, such as the so-called "*cabecilla* system" of patronage written about by Omuhondro (1981) and Wickberg (1965), is an important research subject for the future. I have been told that in the 1950s some associations maintained employment bureaus but this

practice was later discontinued. We may also find that what is often said to be a difference between Cantonese and Hokkiens–that Cantonese associations help newcomers find a job and Hokkien ones do not–is less a subcultural difference between Cantonese and Hokkiens than it is a reflection of the existence in the Philippines of kin-assisted immigration available to Hokkiens but not to Cantonese.

The question of whether associations help newcomers get started raises the more general issue of social service as part of associational activities. On this point, my sixth finding is that social services to members (emergency financial aid, school tuition assistance, charity medical services, etc.) are less than what I would have expected. To be sure, my expectations are colored by my experience studying Cantonese associations in Canada, where more of this kind of aid may be extended than is the case for Hokkien associations overseas, or more particularly, Hokkien associations in Manila. Instead, for some large "traditional" associations and for some non-traditional ones (such as fire brigades) social service to *non*-members–that is, specifically, to ***non***-Chinese–(charity clinics, disaster relief expeditions, etc.) has become a major activity.

Why is this so? The answer would seem to reflect either absence of supply or absence of demand. In supply terms, we know that it is still the regular practice that births, weddings, anniversaries, and funerals are occasions, among those able, for the circulation of funds-much of which may be at some point donated to associational charities. Indeed, some associations may even have a surplus of charitable funds from these sources. (See, 1976, 181 fn. 1). Involved here are broad questions –much in need of research–about the meanings and uses of charity in Chinese society, especially overseas Chinese societies. Charity is a Chinese cultural imperative. But it is also a status marker. Organized charity buys status within Chinese society and acceptance in the larger society. Just as there cannot be leaders of associations without there being ordinary members, or followers, there cannot be givers of charity without recipients-whether they are other Chinese or non-Chinese.

In general, it appears that those organizations likely to have the largest supply of charitable funds and the smallest internal (member) demands upon them are the larger organizations, such as the more prosperous clan associations. In smaller, more intimate organizations, like some of the hometown associations, the supply is probably less and

the member demand is greater. This probably reflects Chinben See's finding that mutual aid and welfare needs were matters about which people turned to smaller, more personal bodies, and, indeed, one reason for forming such bodies.

How large is the demand? Can we speak of a "poverty" sector in Manila's Chinese society? Occasional use of emergency aid is no indicator of poverty. Persistent use of charitable clinics set up for members (by hometown associations, for example) or inability to educate children without consistent, long-term aid are possible indicators of poverty. On the latter point–education of children–we need an analysis of the relative weight given by organizations to scholarships for the needy members as compared with those to be given to the talented. Such an analysis should examine the question according to the size, nature, and prosperity of each individual organization.

As I was warned before coming to Manila, information about poverty in the Chinese society is one of the most difficult things to obtain. The popular belief in Philippine society is that there is none, or, if there is, it is miniscule. All Chinese, sooner or later, "are rich". Within Chinese society itself the same sort of stereotype seems to exist –perhaps as a kind of orthodoxy that cannot be challenged. If you work hard, sooner or later, you will succeed–everyone will. Is Philippine Chinese society uniquely one without failures?

A common response to questions about a poverty sector is that if there is one it is certainly very small–at most 10% of the total Chinese population of Manila. (McBeath, 1973, 42). Those who give this answer usually add: "And in any case, much less than the poverty sector in Philippine society as a whole". This last point is not in dispute. But I question whether 10% is high enough. Some informants have estimated a poverty sector at about 20%. Although most interviewees and others reacted to me with disbelief when I tried out the figure of 20%, some long-time members and sophisticated observers of the Manila Chinese society agreed that 20% was possible, and perhaps even a bit low.

That some kind of welfare need–regular or irregular–has been present to an important degree is implied by Chinben See's argument about the proliferation of small, mutual-aid guaranteeing associations in the 1960s and 1970s. Unless one wants to argue that Chinese society since 1975 has become so prosperous that there is no longer such a need, we must assume there is something worth looking at. Part of the

problem lies in the fact that, as See pointed out, (1988, 329) the poorest, at some point, drop out of sight of the *organized* Chinese society. They cease to resort to the welfare services of its associations and they become a part of the great mass of Filipino poor. I have tried to allow for this in my trial model of social stratification below.

In some of the above paragraphs I have implied that there is a generalized difference in what large, prosperous organizations do and what smaller ones do. There is, for example, a great difference between a clan association that can afford a lavish banquet at a major hotel with paid entertainers, speeches by top leaders in Chinese society, and a glossy souvenir publication, and a clan association of modest means whose clan hall is the venue for a self-prepared meal, with tape-recorded entertainment and leaders of that association as the speakers. These observations of mine are supported by Chinben See's dicussion in his long article of 1976, (pp. 181 ff) in which he distinguishes between large and small clan organizations (the latter being much like large hometown associations) (the latter being not large brotherhood organizations) and large and small brotherhood associations.

This distinction between large and small organizations–of various kinds–opens up the possibility that organizational size may be a more critical variable than some others in determining what an organization does and how it is seen by members and would-be members. This is an attractive approach. It is obvious to any observer, for example, that large, prosperous Manila Chinese schools like Chiang Kai Shek and Philippine Cultural High School are very different from small Chinese schools. Their facilities and teaching staffs are incomparably better, their alumni associations are full of successful people who supply the facilities and support, and their graduates are much more likely to go on to university than those of small schools.

Moreover, in the world of Manila's Chinese organizations, size, prosperity, and prestige are associated with one another. They matter a lot in the recruitment of new members. Since Chinese organizations are largely financed by their leaders, every organization will want to recruit good financiers–persons with resources. But such people will only want to join prestigious organizations–ones that are already doing well–ones from which one's affiliation will bring the joiner some reflected glory. Additionally, joining a smaller organization with fewer "financiers" among its leaders means that a well-endowed new member is facing the prospect of an investment that will drain without

much repayment. Thus, large and prosperous organizations play the prestige game (See, 1988, 326) and become larger, more prosperous and more prestigious by recruiting new leaders from among those with resources. Smaller, poorer associations (and size and resources are usually directly associated with each other) are likely to remain small and poor. Seen in this light, one could argue that large organizations of most types exist more for the prestige they confer upon members, and especially leaders, while small organizations exist largely to provide comradeship and mutual aid.

We must beware some real dangers in this generalizing. In the first place, Chinben See did not attach any specific numbers to what he spoke of as a "large" association or a "small" association. Second, it is tempting but dangerous to generalize from his writings (1976, 179 ff) that a general fault line in class terms appeared in the Chinese society of the 1960s and has not been bridged since; that is, that Philippine Chinese society since that time has been made up essentially of large prosperous businessmen playing the prestige game with certain large organizations and small businessmen who struggle along with associations to help them in their frequently needy periods. In other words, we could easily interpret See's analysis–though he does not say this–as implying a yawning gap in class and organizational terms: two kinds of businessmen and two kinds of organizations.

In fact, in any Chinese organization, regardless of size, there is a general problem of balance between leaders and followers. To be financially viable, there must be a constant supply of leaders with the resources to keep the organization going. But there must also be followers–in most traditional organizations at least–enough of them to establish and maintain a distinction between leaders and followers. Thus, a prestigious organization cannot simply recruit new members for wealth and prestige alone; it must also recruit some followers. And there must be a workable balance between leaders, who supply funds, and members, who are more likely to make demands on them, if the organization is to continue. It would be an interesting research project to try to identify where those balances lie in large organizations on the one hand and small organizations on the other.

Let us now turn my four functional categories: negotiation within Chinese society and with outside bodies; cultural survival and resinification; social services to members; and articulation and achievement of interests. These functions are not necessarily of equivalent

importance; nor is any one of them of the same level of importance at all times. For instance, negotiation, which often takes the form of defense of the interests of a given association or of Chinese society as a whole, came to the fore in the late 19th century. At that time, newly-risen leaders in the Chinese community, anxious about "economic survival in an increasingly unstable political environment" (Cariño, 1989, 63), promoted the defensive organization of the community and turned to China for aid. Again, in the 1950s, defense came to the fore and the five "pyramids" mentioned above were created, largely for defensive purposes. Since 1975, however, Chinese in the Philippines seem less often subject to external assaults and less need of external protection. Negotiation between Chinese associations continues, of course, as a constant. But it does not appear to have been a major reason for forming associations in recent years. (See, 1981, 235).

Cultural survival and resinification is another organizational function present as a constant. The most obvious organizations devoted to it are the schools. Since the 1960s there has been concern about the Filipinization, or "assimilation" of Chinese youth. That has led to much discussion, but not necessarily much in the way of new schools. Meanwhile, other kinds of associations have tried to recapture the attention of youth as discussed above. One important and unique development is the emergence of Kaisa Para sa Kaunlaran, Inc., an organization of mostly educated, middle-class Filipinos of Chinese background whose cultural formula for resinification is expressed in their self-appellation: "Chinese-Filipinos". Kaisa's organizational coalescence in the late 1980s, out of earlier efforts going back to 1970, marks out, organizationally, a cultural middle-ground for resinification: revival of Chinese culture with full integration of Chinese into the larger society as Filipinos of Chinese heritage.

Social services, ranging from companionship and mutual support to assistance though life's crises, and on to emergency or even regular aid to the poorer members, were probably much more important in the period before World War II, a time when families were relatively much less common than they have since become. This aspect or function of associational activity seems to have faded since the 1950s, either because, as some believe, the entire Chinese society is so prosperous there is no longer any need, or else, as I suspect, for other, more complex reasons. I have tried to deal with this issue earlier in this report.

Finally, there is articulation and achievement of interests. That is an area of activity with many aspects. It may be a matter of promoting the prestige and influence of the organization within the context of Chinatown politics. Or it may be a question of articulating the interests of a sector of business represented by a given association. Or again, it may refer to the interests and achievements of individual members, in particular, the leaders. I believe it is possible to argue that whether or not Manila's Chinese society is a "business society" in the sense used by Omohundro (1981), there is no denying that its major concern is business activity and that there is a preoccupation among its members with success in business terms. Certainly, for those not born in the Philippines the purpose of going there was and is to better oneself economically through business. To do so requires establishing a reputation in Chinese society–initially, at least, in Chinatown. To do that requires intense business and social networking; and, for that, organizations and their activities can be very useful. Membership, and particularly leadership in organizations thus becomes an important vehicle for facilitating the success of individuals (See, 1981, 242). In a political sense, organizations are also instruments of leader power, prestige, (Cariño, 1989, 61-63) control, and leadership replenishment. These are points I expect to develop in other papers.

Questions raised by the findings

Now, some questions (besides the ones already raised). First, it has been common to say (e.g., McBeath, 1973, chap. 3) that Chinese organizations hold individuals within a Chinese community, thereby retarding their assimilation or integration. Is this the case with all Chinese associations? I would like to argue that it is not. For one thing, there is the obvious example of Kaisa, an organization of persons of Chinese heritage devoted to integration without losing Chinese culture. If Kaisa is a "Chinese" organization, then it is one that facilitates, rather than retards movement out of the Chinese atmosphere and into something larger. But aside from Kaisa there are other, non-traditional organizations that have at least the potential of facilitating transcendence of the Chinese "community". In this group I would include such non-traditional asciations as the Chinese Lions, the fire brigades, and some of the alumni associations (churches and church operated schools might also be placed here).

Why these associations? After all, their members are all of Chinese background, their language of group interaction is likely to be Chinese, and their unifying principles all refer to Chinese society. Several things about them stand out. They are *modern* Chinese associations, not "traditional" ones, and they are based upon models of modern organizations drawn from outside of China. Their internal relationships are more democratic than those of most "traditional" Chinese associations and their functions are more limited and specifically focused.

The Chinese Lions seem to exist for two purposes: conspicuous social service and avid business networking. In this they are like Lions the world over. Because they are linked to the international Lions organization they necessarily have some relations with non-Chinese. And although the purpose of an all-Chinese Lions Club is to network with other Chinese using the Chinese language, the adherance to the general principles of the international organization with its at least nominal linkages across ethnic lines means that they are at least prospectively able to move from an exclusively *Chinese* Lions business network into a more cosmopolitan one.

The fire brigades serve neighborhoods that include Filipinos as well as Chinese. Their medical-dental charity clinics serve almost exclusively a Filipino clientele. Alumni associations like those of Chiang Kai Shek and PCHS exist to raise funds for the school and to provide social occasions for their members. In these they seem very much analogous to their Western counterparts. These two alumni associations (CKS and PCHS) also mount variety shows to raise funds for their schools–shows that are aimed at attracting an audience that includes non-Chinese as well as Chinese. Moreover, members of both the brigades and these alumni associations can be spoken of as "middle class". The brigade leaders are well established businessmen or professionals and their charity clinics are staffed, of course, by doctors-in-training. The alumni of CKS and PCHS are almost all university-educated and their social styles appear to be of a kind shared with the Filipino middle class.

In short, the nature and function of these three organizations and, additionally in the case of the latter two types of organization, the education and class status of members all serve to make these associations capable of acting as a bridge from "traditional" Chinese associ-

ations to increased social interaction with non-Chinese people. Therefore, my reaction to the usual assertion, by McBeath and others, that Chinese associations hold members within a Chinese orbit is that some Chinese associations may do just the reverse, facilitating exit from an exclusively "Chinese" social life.

A second question is: is there such a thing now as a "Chinese community" in Manila? Can the term "community"–or as I have called it, "community core"–be meaningfully used, or has Chinese society now become so diverse that very little sense of community remains? Does a sense of community require that there be an external threat, such as has existed for so much of Chinese-Filipino history? Whenever, as is the case now, that threat is in abeyance and the time is one of expanding business opportunities, does everyone simply seek his own fortune, paying no heed to what is best for the Chinese group? In other words, are we talking about either (a) a sense of community that used to exist when the Chinese society was much smaller, and is now gone forever; or (b) a sense of community that comes and goes according to the dangers from outside the Chinese society?

A third question is related to the second: do organizations help to bring Chinese society together as a community? Or, do they have the opposite effect–exacerbating the clash of interests and ambitions?

Fourth, what effect does increasing professionalization have upon organizations? Some Chinese professionals do form their own associations. The Chinese practitioners of Western-style medicine, for example, have long had their own organization. Do such organizations exist primarily to protect the interest of Chinese professionals against non-Chinese professionals? Or do they exist to be class boundary markers–to distinguish Chinese professionals from all other Chinese? To what extent do Chinese professionals involve themselves in Chinatown affairs? To what extent do they join and become active in "traditional" Chinese associations?

Fifth, what role is played by Catholic, Protestant, and other churches, and by Buddhist and other temples? By some estimates (Melckebeke, 1969; Shangkuan, 1982), one-fourth to one-half of the Chinese population of the Philippines is at least nominally Catholic. Less than 5% are Protestant, but they are an active group. Chinese religions are accepted by something over one-half of the population. What accounts for religious orientation, and, more interestingly, religious activism, where it occurs? Besides sincere belief in theology

or doctrine, what are the most important determinants of organized religious activism by individuals: life-orientation, belief in good fortune, desire for close relations with others, business and social networking, or desire (in the case of non-Chinese religions) to be accepted by non-Chinese people?

Sixth, and finally, what can the study of Chinese organizations in Manila contribute to our understanding of the organizational behavior of Chinese outside of China in general? What can the study of worldwide Chinese behavior tell us about Manila's Chinese organizations? Do such commonly used terms in the literature on Chinese outside of China as *huaqiao* ("overseas Chinese"), *huaren* ("cultural Chinese"), and *huayi* ("Chinese descendants") have any usefulness in understanding the Chinese society of Manila, its organizations and its ethnicity? Are these terms too broad and too focused on a few aspects of personal circumstances or orientation to be helpful?

"Overseas Chinese", or *huaqiao* refers to an individual's orientation towards the host society and towards China. *Huaren,* literally "Chinese person", sidesteps that issue, focusing instead on the presence in this person of some aspects of or attitudes toward Chinese culture. *Huayi,* or "Chinese descendant", focuses on the generational factor. It strongly implies that, in contrast to *huaqiao* and *huaren,* "Chinese descendants" have a different attitude towards China and towards their host countries, and also a different–probably less informed and less intense–attitude towards Chinese culture. Are the characteristics and concerns implied by these three terms useful in helping us understand the individual behavior that leads to the formation and maintenance of organizations among Chinese outside of China, whether in Manila or elsewhere? Or do they conceal more than they reveal?

A model of socio-cultural stratification and mobility

Finally, to illustrate and expand on some of what has been said above, I would like to present here a trial model of a stratification system to represent social and cultural status and movement in Chinese Manila. Several points require explanation. First of all, this is not intended to be a representation of the structure of political power in Chinese society in Manila. While it is true that the higher the

economic level the higher the political level is likely to be, this scheme also includes persons whose social status is derived as much from their education and occupation as from that of business success. The political level of such persons is not easily determined. What I wish to illustrate here is that economic and cultural "success" serve to stratify Chinese society. I also wish to indicate the lines of mobility within the general scheme.

The underlying assumptions are as follows. First, that social mobility and cultural mobility are related; that is, that social positioning is accompanied by an appropriate orientation in terms of cultural values–whether Chinese values, Filipino values, generalized modern values, or various mixtures thereof. A second assumption, pointed out at the beginning of this paper, is that we can conceive of Manila's Chinese society as having a community, roughly analogous to Chinatown, and a larger surrounding sphere, which is, in turn, encased in a still larger Philippine society. A third assumption is that success–usually understood in material and in social terms–is a prime value among Manila's Chinese and that movement up or down the stratification scale or horizontally into larger participation in Philippine society can be viewed in terms of perceived success and failure. Fourth, that organizations can be fitted into this scheme because membership, and particularly leadership in organizations is associated with success or failure, and the organizations are also ranked in prestige terms by type and size.

A fifth assumption is that the conception of a "community core" can be viewed in both economic and cultural terms. It refers to the body of people and organizations whose lives and activities are carried on almost entirely within a Chinese business and cultural context. From that it follows that there is a "Chinese economy", or "Chinese economic system" (cf See, 1988, 331: "the Chinese trading network"), made up entirely of Chinese doing business with each other. This system is large enough that individuals may operate completely within it without having to learn language or other skills needed to function in a larger economic (and cultural) context. Sixth, that upward and downward movement in the part of the scale that is entirely within the community core is possible, but so is horizontal movement out of the core, "emerging" or "exiting" into the wider Chinese society and perhaps even beyond, to the still larger Philippine society. Note that in the graph some of the boundary lines are solid while others are broken.



The former imply very little likelihood of penetration; the latter suggest ease of exit or emergence. Indeed, it is likely that there are many individuals perched on the broken-line boundaries at one place or another.

Now let us look more closely at the graph. Notice that the community core is represented by the boxes in the centre. At the top are the leaders of the most important associations: the Federation, Manila Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the large clan associations, and the large trade associations. By my estimate here, these leaders make at most 5% of the total Chinese population.

Beneath them is a much larger (45% of the population here) stratum entitled "Prospectively Emergent Community Core". More about the meaning of that in a minute. This group includes the leaders of such organizations as the *Hong Men*, churches, temples, and fire brigades. It also includes members of the Lions, the alumni associations of large Philippine Chinese schools and those of Hong Kong schools, and the growing body of educated business and professional people.

Beneath that is a layer–estimated at 30% of the population–I have called the "Non-emergent Core". This is made up of ordinary members of large clan associations, trade associations, *Hong Men* organizations, churches, and temples, as well as leaders and members of district and hometown associations, small clan associations, brotherhoods, musical and sports societies, and alumni associations of small Chinese schools in the Philippines or schools in mainland China.

According to this picture, it appears that 80% of the population is somewhere within the "community core". That is not the case. Note that the broken line on the upper half of the right margin of the core allows easy movement back and forth between this part of the core and the larger Chinese society. The 5% "leaders" stratum may be made up of persons entirely within the core or only partly so. I have not attempted to guess how many of each. Likewise, the "Prospectively Emergent Community Core" includes those not at the top in Chinatown but a middle sector, with prospects of moving across the dashed line ("emerging") into the larger Chinese society. Thus, an indeterminate number of people at this level are within the core, some others are on the boundary between it and the larger Chinese society, and a large number are completely a part of Chinese society and outside the Chinatown core. This middle level of 45% of the population is probably

the most diverse in cultural terms.

By contrast, there is the next lower level in the core: the 30% or so I have called the "Non-emergent Core". The right hand boundary of this group is solid, not dashed, indicating there is little or no movement across it. This is, if you like, the "hard core" of the Chinese community, or Chinatown.

Now if all the above–in and out of Chinatown–make up 80% of the Chinese population, what about the other 20%? Here I have used my estimate of 20% poverty given above and, following Chinben See (1988, 329) and the verbal comments of others, I have tried to show here the movement of the poorest and least successful entirely out of the Chinese core and towards emergence even from the larger Chinese society, to ultimately disappear into Filipino society. These people are the passive members of poorer associations, non-members of any association, persistently unsuccessful Chinese. As the graph indicates, these people exit across a dashed line on the opposite boundary of the core structure from the others–the "failure" side. The implication of this is that the successful in Chinese society at a certain level move up in the core and out (the top two levels) towards the larger Chinese society and perhaps, in some cases, beyond into the larger Filipino society. The failures also move out towards Filipino society, but on the "failure" side. One small-size exception: the tiny segments of "tycoons" (less than 1%), who may move up through the ceiling of the core "leaders" and on in the direction of Filipino society on the "success" side.

Thus, an immigrant is likely to come into the 30% stratum, but can move up within the core to the next level where he may begin to move horizontally as well. Likewise, a person born into the 30% stratum may follow this pattern. There is also mobility in a downward direction, probably within the core and, at the worst, exiting on the "failure" side. Thus, both mobility up and mobility down at several levels are likely to be accompanied by horizontal mobility.

Cultural influences work the same way. As one moves up from the 30% stratum to the 45% one and maybe even above that, the external influences from the Filipinized larger Chinese society at these levels increases and one begins to change, culturally. One's understanding of Chinese values and practices that the 30% simply follow automatically may increase, while simultaneously, and paradoxically, one's attraction to various other cultural forms increases: modern Chinese

culture, Filipino culture, generalized modern culture. As one goes down and eventually out, one becomes Filipinized by increasing association.

No doubt this is an abstract and schematic view of Manila's Chinese society. It is vulnerable to criticism on those and other grounds. But it is an attempt to put together personal stratification (measured in terms of wealth, reputation, leadership, education, occupation, and "success") with organizational and cultural stratification. The result is a single model that allows for the diversity of the society and its cultural orientations, and the interpretation of organizational membership and leadership. I welcome criticisms.

* *The research upon which this report is based was financed by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Grant No. 410-90-1344). I gratefully acknowledge this support.*

Sources

Amyot, Jacques.THE CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA: A STUDY ON ADAPTATION OF CHINESE FAMILISM TO THE PHILIPPINE ENVIRONMENT. (Chicago: University of Chicago Department of Anthropology Philippine Studies Program, 1960). Reprinted: (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Institute of Philippine Culture, 1973).

Cariño, Theresa Chong. "The 19th Century and the Development of Community Among the Chinese in the Philippines," *Anuaryo*, 7 (1989), 51-66.

Crissman, Lawrence. "The Segmentary Structure of Urban Overseas Chinese Communities," *Man*, n.s. 2 (2) (1967), 185-204.

Freedman, Maurice. "Immigrants and Associations: Chinese in 19th Century Singapore," in L.A. Fallers, ed., IMMIGRANTS AND ASSOCIATIONS (The Hague: Mouton, 1967), 17-48. Reprint: G. William Skinner, ed., THE STUDY OF CHINESE SOCIETY: ESSAYS BY MAURICE FREEDMAN (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979), 61-83.

Go Bon Juan. DIQU-XING DI RENTONG: HUAREN DI DIQU-XING ZUOYONG CHUTAN (Regional consciousness: A preliminary investigation of the functions of the regionalism of Chinese people). Unpublished paper presented at the Conference on Overseas Chinese Communities Towards the 21st Century, Singapore, November 1990.

Guldin, Gregory. OVERSEAS AT HOME: THE FUJIANESE OF HONG KONG. Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Winconsin, 1977. University Microfilms 77-25, 822.

McBeath, Gerald A. POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF THE PHILIPPINE CHINESE. (Berkeley: University of California Center for South and Southeast Asia Studies, 1973).

Melckebeke, Carlo M.J. CHINESE DIASPORA: STATISTICAL ESTIMATE. (10th ed., Singapore, 1969).

Omohundro, John. "Chinese Merchant Society in the Philippines," *Philippine Sociological Review*, 21.2 (April 1973), 169-80.

____________. CHINESE MERCHANT FAMILIES IN ILOILO. (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press, 1981). Simultaneous publication: (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1981).

____________. "Social Networks and Business Success for the Philippine Chinese," in Linda Lim and Peter Gosling ed., THE CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, vol. I (Singapore: Maruzen, 1983).

Pacho, Arturo. "The Chinese Community in the Philippines: Status and Conditions," *Sojourn*, 1.1 (February 1986), 76-91.

See, Chinben. "Feilubin Huaren wenhua di zhixu" (Persistence and Preservation of Chinese Culture in the Philippines), *Zhongyang Yanjiu Yuan Minzuxue Yanjiu Suo Jikan* (Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, Taiwan), 42 (1976), 119-206.

____________. "Chinese Clanship in the Philippine Setting," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 12.1 (March 1981), 224-247.

____________. "Chinese Organizations and Ethnic Identity in the Philippines," in Jennifer Cushman and Wang Gungwu, ed., CHANGING IDENTITIES OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN CHINESE SINCE WORLD WAR II. (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1988), 319-334.

Shangkuan, S.C. in CHINESE CHURCHES HANDBOOK, ed. Gail Law (Hong Kong: CCCOWE, 1982), p. 315.

Skinner, G. William. CHINESE SOCIETY IN THAILAND: AN ANALYTICAL HISTORY (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957).

Strauch, Judith. CHINESE VILLAGE POLITICS IN THE MALAY STATE (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981).

Weightman, George H. "Community Organization of Chinese Living in Manila," *Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review*, 11.1 (1954), 24-39.

____________. "A Preliminary Ecological Description of the Chinese Community in Manila," *Philippine Sociological Review*, 3.4 (November 1955), 23-27.

____________. THE PHILIPPINE CHINESE. A CULTURAL HISTORY OF A MARGINAL TRADING COMMUNITY. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Cornell University, 1961.

____________. "The Chinese Family and Sib in the Philippines," *Lipunan* 1.1 (1965), 9-16.

____________. "The Philippine Chinese from Aliens to Cultural Minority," *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* 16.2 (Summer 1985), 161-179.

Wickberg, Edgar. THE CHINESE IN PHILIPPINE LIFE, 1850-1898 (New (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

______________________. "Some Comparative Perspectives on Contemporary Chinese Ethnicity in the Philippines," *Yazhou Wenhua* (Asian Culture), 14 (April 1990), 23-37.

World News, October 10, 1990: "Huaqiao, Huaren shetuan fazhan xin qushi," (New Trends in Overseas Chinese Association Development).

The Chinese in Negros Occidental

Modesto P. Sa-onoy

Introduction

The Chinese in Negros Occidental had progressed because of the friendly environment which they found from the very beginning of their immigration to the province. The result was friction-free inter-marriages and social inter-relationships between the natives and the Intsik. While the Negrosanon were also influenced by the strong and official biases of the Spanish regime against the Chinese and the spill-over prejudice by the American and the early Philippine governments, the Chinese and their descendants in Negros Occidental did not suffer the same fate as had been experienced by the Chinese in other parts of the Philippines.

The arrival of the Chinese in Negros Occidental was not seen as a threat to the economic enterprises of the natives. While the natives were engaged in subsistence agriculture, the Chinese and the Chinese-mestizos were traders who provided goods that the natives needed or which improved their lives. The Chinese were skilled workers and industrious individuals whose patience and humility contrasted sharply with the manner of the Castillan colonizers.

The Chinese came to Negros at the time of great need for skills in the sugar industry and in the booming new enterprises as well as changing social manners of "sophisticated" living among the emerging prosperous natives of the province. They did not come to conquer, to colonize or to take over the native enterprises. The Chinese thus prospered and inter-married with Filipinas from the upper crust of society.

The cause of this friendly environment can be traced to the fact that Negros Occidental had not been given importance by the Spanish colonial government until the last 50 years of their colonial rule. When it was developed later, anti-Chinese sentiments in the Philippines had died down somewhat; in fact, in some cases official welcome was