

<sup>20</sup> "Ramos Favors Mass Resignation of Cops," *Manila Times*, 17 February 1993, p.1. See also other papers on the same date.

<sup>21</sup> *Philippine Star*, *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, and others; 14 November to 7 December 1993, reporting news of Charles Walton's kidnapping. He was released on 7 December 1993.

<sup>22</sup> "Government Execs Defend Tax Campaign", *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 17 September 1993.

<sup>23</sup> "BIR Tax Drive Not Aimed At Particular Group-Officials," *Philippine Star*, 17 September 1993.

# C CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR OF THE CHINESE IN METRO MANILA\*

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## H STUDYING POLITICAL ATTITUDES

HOW DO THE Metro Manila Chinese define their relationship with the Philippine political system? For the majority of them who are Filipino citizens, how do they perceive the political processes, the leadership and instrumentalities of government, and their own duties and responsibilities, rights and privileges as members of the policy? To what extent do they feel that institutions of government, both national and local, are able to represent, protect and promote their interests? To what extent are the Chinese in turn perceived and treated as loyal and responsible citizens, beyond being sources of financial and logistical support during elections? These are important questions to consider, and will require intensive study.

Attitudes are measured by examining several attributes. First is their sense of localism/cosmopolitanism. Localism here refers to the importance or value they attach to communal or particular concerns, while the cosmopolitanism in turn means the importance or value attached to the national or more universal concerns.

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
\* The study has been published as a monograph by the Philippine-China Development Resource Center in 1994.

They are likewise assessed in terms of information and understanding of the political system; positions regarding specific issues; and sense of citizenship duty. The sense of political efficacy - i.e. the perception that they wield some influence or control over public concerns - is also examined. Behavior is then studied in terms of levels and types of direct and indirect engagements with the political system.

If aggregate results of the survey indicate that the Chinese exhibit high cosmopolitanism, high information and understanding of politics, high sense of citizenship duty, high sense of political efficacy, and high levels of participation and other political activity, then, by our definition political integration is achieved. If the sources on all counts are low, then a low level of political integration exists.

We then attempt to correlate age, citizenship, education, domicile, occupation and income with political integration. The following analytical framework may serve as a guide:

**Personal Attributes and Political Attitudes**  
-How these influence political integration



### SURVEY ASSUMPTIONS

The hypothesis being tested in this research tries to determine the relevant factors influencing the process of integration, in particular, such attributes as age, citizenship, domicile, education, occupation and income.

We shall try to prove (or disprove) that Chinese who are of the younger generation, have acquired Filipino citizenship, reside outside the "Chinatown" area, have been educated in Filipino or Filipinized Chinese schools, are employed in occupations other than business, and who belong to higher and lower income levels, tend to be better integrated politically. Conversely, older generation Chinese, non-Filipino citizens, those who live and work in Chinatown, those who studied in Chinese schools, who are employed in business and who belong to the middle class, will tend to exhibit lower levels of political integration.

### USEFULNESS OF THE STUDY

The researcher hopes that this study will contribute towards a better conceptual understanding of the process of political integration involving ethnic minorities. At the same time, it is hoped that the study can generate data that will (1) challenge racial stereotypes that tend to needlessly foster ethnic animosities between Filipinos and ethnic Chinese in the Philippines; and (2) guide public policy formulation vis-a-vis the role of the ethnic Chinese in Philippine nation-building.

An understanding of the Philippine Chinese may be an input in the formulation of public policies relating to the roles of the Chinese in national integration, in economic development, and in official policy vis-a-vis China and Taiwan. Any Filipino or Chinese-Filipino who is concerned with national unity and nation-building, be it from the cultural, sociological, economic or political dimension, may find the study worthwhile. For the ethnic Chinese, it is hoped that this study will help them understand themselves and their surroundings better, and thereby raise awareness of their own role in nation-building.

The study's theoretical significance is considered secondary to its policy repercussions and may be far less ambitious, although it is hoped that the data generated will help guide future theory-building efforts as far as alien ethnic minorities are concerned. There are many theories on ethnic minorities that may be of interest to those studying the Philippine-Chinese, but theory is, unfortunately, ignored in this study because immersing oneself in the literature on race and race relations would stretch deadlines too far beyond what was originally intended. The definition of "nations" vis-a-vis "ethnies", the effects of historical "diaspora" on the cultures of immigrant communities, the relationship between "race" and "class" categories are but some theoretical issues one might wish to look into.

In some way, this study represents a methodological breakthrough of sorts because by successfully employing survey questionnaires, it challenges the long-held premise that the Chinese will not reveal themselves on anything that even remotely relates to politics, especially to an "outsider". By soliciting the cooperation of Chinese community schools and organizations, we have also tried to break down walls of suspicion and indifference that have helped build images of the ethnic Chinese as a closed community.

The conclusions presented here are based largely on questionnaire responses. Attitudes and behavior as gauged from the subjects' responses alone obviously do not give a complete picture of the integration phenomenon. Other indicators of the level of political integration might be the extent of the minority group's representation in leadership positions (executive, legislative, judiciary and civil service); amount of influence over the agencies and instruments of government; existence of political parties that would explicitly carry their interests; obedience to laws and ordinances, among others. The results of this study must be examined in relation to other indicators, but these are treated only minimally in this paper.

While most studies of the ethnic Chinese have tried to examine them as a community — i.e. through their organizations, schools, churches, media, and leaders, our own unit of analysis is the individual. This will test the implicit assumption of the homogeneity of the Chinese community. It will also challenge their stereotyped "differentness" from Filipinos, and provide some basis for future examination of the influence of their organizations upon individual members. However, on occasion groups behave differently from what one would expect to be an aggregation of individual behavior. Even if most individuals would tend toward one or another position, the dynamics of organization, and even external circumstances, may interact with collective perceptions so that a group may end up behaving in a manner discordant with each member's individual actions.

Our approach relies mainly on asking individuals to describe their own perceptions and activities relating to politics in the Philippines. Some scholars might feel that independent observation or even the participant-observer type of study would have been preferable as alternative or supplementary approaches. As an "outsider" studying a relatively closed and self-contained ethnic community and as a non-speaker of their dominant dialect, there are many natural limitations to the choice of survey methodology. But the researcher as an anonymous outsider may in fact

have enjoyed certain advantages, such as the subjects not having to self-consciously weigh their responses with community status or even considerations of personal safety.

Another limitation is that the data is gathered at one particular point in time. A time-series analysis would have indicated much better the directions of integration. Focusing on the contemporary, however, allows the researcher a deeper appreciation of the responses because of familiarity with specific political and other current events and circumstances that may have direct bearing on the subjects' perceptions. Fortunately, the surveys conducted by Gerald McBeath more than two decades ago (albeit with a rather different emphasis), and by Pacho and Tilman give us some basis for comparing our findings with earlier discussions of attitudinal and behavioral patterns.

This study, finally, focuses only on what the Chinese themselves reveal about the extent of their integration, and does not attempt to reach impossible absolute truths or grand theories. As any social scientist knows, the entire range of human experience is so vast. By focusing on certain aspects, we hope to gain only a little understanding of human nature — especially our own frailties as human beings — so that we can help change it for the better.

#### THE MODUS OPERANDI

We were forewarned by McBeath, McCarthy and Pacho of methodological problems in employing the behavioral approach to study the Philippine Chinese. It is no coincidence that most of the earlier studies have dealt with their history, structures, institutions, or organizational dynamics — all of which are fortunately somewhat more accessible to scholars and analysis.

The principal method of data gathering employed by the researcher was the survey questionnaire. A six-part survey questionnaire was fielded to a sample of Metro Manila residents 18-65 years of age. Cluster sampling was undertaken to determine the selection of respondents. Any type of random sampling would have been difficult to accomplish for the purposes of this research, because there are no open listings of ethnic Chinese. Moreover, organizations that are likely to keep rosters are not likely to volunteer them for reasons of security. On the basis of previous empirical studies of the Chinese, the difficulty of obtaining cooperation by individuals for academic studies has already been established.

Because this study wanted to compare Filipino and Chinese political attitudes and behavior and correlate these with age, education, citizenship, occupation, residence and income, it was necessary that we get a good representation for each of these variables. Our first problem was the impossibility of coming up with a truly representative sample of the Metro Manila Chinese population, for various reasons, to wit:

- absence of any clear-cut definition of what would be classified as "ethnic Chinese";
- lack of consistent or accurate government estimates of their numbers; or, for that matter,
- inadequacy of systematic efforts by official agencies to document their presence through lists or census;
- unwillingness of Chinese organizations to disclose membership rosters and similar data. This is understandable given the extent of their collective negative experiences as a minority ethnic group; and
- this researcher's own limitations with regard to time and logistics.

A check with the election registrar of Manila yielded a list of predominantly Chinese surnames for the third districts of Metro Manila, which includes the Binondo or Chinatown area. From such a list, a random sample might have been selected. However, it would have been impossible to replicate the procedure for areas outside of Chinatown which we also wanted to include. An attempt to generate lists via Chinese-owned corporations registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission would have given the sample bias, since no comparable listing would exist for the self-employed, unemployed, small-scale or professional sector. Moreover, since only nationality or citizenship and not necessarily ethnicity is recorded by the SEC, the researcher would have had to rely on surnames again. This is, as any Filipino knows, inaccurate because many Chinese-sounding surnames (Lim, Uy) belong to persons who by our definition would not qualify as ethnic Chinese. On the other hand, many ethnic Chinese and even prominent personalities in the Chinese community have adopted Filipino or Spanish surnames.

Moreover, the much-touted secrecy or perhaps the assumed air of indifference displayed by the ethnic Chinese on subjects relating to politics leads us to doubt whether the individuals in a generated random sample would even be likely to respond to a survey of this nature. Despite possible

high interest in politics, one aggravating circumstance was the spate of kidnappings of wealthy and middle class Chinese that occurred in the months immediately following the elections. This contributed in no small way to a strong sense of distrust and insecurity in dealing with strangers - researchers included.

It was apparent that the best and easiest way to approach Chinese individuals would be through their organizations and institutions. The Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce, schools and alumni associations, churches, family associations and other organizations could possibly have been recruited for endorsement of the survey to their members. Again this strategy would have posed a dilemma because of the fractiousness, factionalism and intense politics within the Metro Manila Chinese community. One of the limitations of survey research, as many know, is that respondents' answers are likely to be influenced by their perception of the person or organization conducting or supporting the study and their perception of its purposes and objectives. Moreover, in many instances respondents are likely to feed information that they think is expected of them. It was observed that endorsement by one major organization or another might result in the exclusion of members of other organizations or non-associated individuals, therefore introducing some bias to the sample. We deliberately avoided such an approach.

The methodology employed in this study was developed from a reading of Robinson and Rusk' *Measures of Political Attitudes* (1973), Arturo Pacho's *Methodological Problems in the Study of Political Attitudes of Ethnic: the Chinese in the Philippines* (1980), and the survey of socio-political attitudes among Philippine Chinese youth by Gerald McBeath, McBeath, in his 1968-1969 survey of over 3,000 Chinese high school students throughout the Philippines, led the way in demonstrating the importance of Chinese schools not only as objects of study themselves but as instrumental to research on broader issues regarding the ethnic Chinese. For the current survey, we approached schools belonging to the different types McBeath suggested. These were the chamber schools and the sectarian schools which followed a dual (Chinese-English) curriculum influenced by Taiwan's Education Ministry; and there were Filipinized Chinese academies which offered Chinese language instruction but otherwise followed a Philippine curriculum.

We selected 16 schools out of 35 in the Metro Manila area, keeping in mind the need for representation of different income groups and different residential areas. In the end, only eight schools agreed to participate

in the research. Two were Filipinized Chinese elite academies, four were chamber-controlled non sectarian schools, while two were sectarian (one Buddhist and one Catholic) Chinese institutions. Five were in the Chinatown area and immediate surroundings, while three were outside this area. A check with the school authorities indicated that different income groups were sufficiently represented by the eight schools.

Of the schools which declined to participate, five were sectarian (Protestant) academies and three were non-sectarian chamber schools.

Revealing that the focus of the study is ethnic integration would have made some respondents self-conscious and possibly defensive on the issue of allegiance and inter-ethnic relations, so the survey was formulated as a general-in-scope post-election survey of Metro Manila residents. Only the school administrator (principal or director) was informed of the actual target group. The schools were then asked to distribute the questionnaires to students in the first and fourth grades, as well as first and fourth year high school levels, and to instruct students to give out the survey forms to their parents, grandparents or other relatives from 18 to 65 years of age. Two directors preferred to directly administer the surveys to parents at a meeting of the Alumni Association and at a parent-teacher conference. One school—Chiang Kai Shek College—had its college-level students, teachers and non-teaching personnel, serve as respondents.

The questionnaires were to be collected from the schools after a week, but some took an entire month to turn in the accomplished forms, citing slow returns and examinations as reasons.

Apart from the schools, two organizations of relatively young and progressive Chinese also helped distribute surveys among their members, but their returns only constituted 4.8 percent of the total, while returns from the schools made up the remaining 95 percent.

A pre-test involving 31 persons was held to find out if respondents would reply to the fairly long questionnaire, and whether questions were properly framed and clearly understood. As a result of the pre-test, the number of questions was cut down, and some were rephrased. The final questionnaire had 61 multiple choice questions and nine sub-questions in which respondents are asked to supply additional information. The sub-questions had a rather high rate of non-response.

A total of 1,430 questionnaire forms were fielded, with expected returns of 30 percent or about 430. More than 500 returns came in, of which 472 were valid forms, exceeding expectations. The invalid returns were

either under-aged, meaning students may have filled in the forms themselves, or were left largely incomplete. Three were deliberate and exact duplicates of one set of responses filled in by the same person.

Of the 472 valid returns, 346 or 73.3 percent were ethnic Chinese while 126 or 26.6 percent were ethnic Filipinos. The 346 returns become the basis of our conclusions regarding ethnic Chinese political attitudes and behavior.

The 346 are less than 0.07 percent (one out of every 1,387) of our estimated Chinese population in Metro Manila of a high 480,000, and 0.09 percent (almost one out of every 1,000) of our low estimate of 384,000. The limitations of our sampling procedures caution us to take the results of this survey as merely indicative of the sample itself, rather than representative of the entire Metro Manila Chinese community. Nevertheless, the survey is instructive.


The survey design was originally formulated in English, then presented back to back with Chinese translation. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with statements using a 5-point bipolar (Likert-type) scale where 1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=don't know, 4=disagree and 5=strongly disagree. A few questionnaire items required elaboration or rank ordering.

#### PROFILE OF THE SAMPLE

For our purposes, we classified as ethnic Chinese anyone who has at least two of the following traits, as reported in the information sheet attached to the questionnaire; pure or mestizo Chinese parents, Chinese citizenship, speaks a Chinese language or dialect, and attends a Chinese (including Filipinized Chinese) school. In cases of doubt or ambiguity, these were corroborated by a Chinatown location of their residence and business, and to a much lesser extent by membership in organizations and religious affiliation.

Table 1 GENDER DISTRIBUTION


Female	180	52.0%
Male	159	46.0%
No Answer	7	2.0%
<b>Total Sample</b>	<b>346</b>	



One reason there may be more female than male respondents is that filling up school questionnaires is usually the mother's role, universally but most especially in Chinese families where the women's responsibilities are still often limited to full-time child-rearing. The fact that we were able to elicit a good number of male respondents was actually unexpected, and may be attributed to the subject matter of the survey - "politics" - being regarded as the domain of the male.


**Table 2 AGE DISTRIBUTION**

18-30 yrs.	122	35.2%
31-45 yrs.	121	35.0%
46-65 yrs.	38	11.0%
No Answer	65	18.8%



Most of the respondents belong to the young or middle-aged group. The low percentage of responses from the 46-65 age bracket may be partly attributable to lack of education among the older Chinese, especially the original immigrants.

We shall also explore the correlation between age and level of information, interest and participation in national politics to determine if younger generation Chinese tend to be better integrated with the political system than older ones.



**Table 3 CITIZENSHIP**


<b>Filipino</b>	285	82.4%
of which		
natural-born	131	37.9%
naturalized	74	21.4%
by marriage	10	2.9%
by election	3	0.9%
no answer	67	19.3%
<b>Chinese</b>	36	10.4%
<b>Others</b>	9	2.6%
<b>No answer</b>	16	4.6%

Many respondents appeared unsure or ambiguous about how to describe citizenship and the means for acquiring such. This is also reflected in the high percentage of non-response. Many of those who did respond to this item are overwhelmingly Filipino citizens. Eighty-one percent of the 46-65 age group, 87 percent of the 31-45, and 86 percent of the 18-30 year olds, reported Filipino citizenship.


The high percentage of Filipino citizens even among the oldest age group attests to the success of the mass naturalization law, although we have to take into account the fact that the survey is on politics and therefore may have tended to eliminate participation by non-citizens.

**Table 4 BIRTHPLACE**

Philippines	301	87.0%
China	16	4.6%
Hong Kong	13	3.8%
Taiwan	1	0.3%
No answer	15	4.3%



Among those who declared Filipino citizenship, 94 percent were born in the Philippines. Importantly, 26 of the 36 Chinese citizens (72 percent) were also born in the Philippines.




**Table 5 PARENTAGE**

<b>Pure Chinese parents</b>	143	41.3%
<b>Mixed parentage</b>	109	31.5%
of which:		
- <b>one Chinese parent</b>		
mother (Filipino father)	60	17.3%
father (Filipino mother)	17	4.9%
mother (Fil-Chi father)	4	1.2%
father (Fil-Chi mother)	1	0.3%
- <b>Filipino-Chinese parent/s</b>		
father and mother	20	5.8%
mother (Filipino father)	6	1.7%
father (Filipino mother)	1	0.3%
<b>Others (British-Chinese)</b>	2	0.6%
<b>No answer</b>	92	26.6%


While the percentage of Roman Catholics (Table 6) is lower than the commonly cited 80-85 percent national average, it is still a significant number and a good indication of social and cultural integration with mainstream Filipino society. What is also significant in the findings is that only 62 percent of those aged 18-30 are Roman Catholics (with 27 percent declaring themselves Protestant or "Christian"), compared to 72 percent Catholics in the 31-46-year old group (nine percent Protestant or "Christian"). This is an apparent trend for Filipinos in general, and the ethnic Chinese appear not to have been spared.

**Table 6 RELIGION**

Roman Catholic	216	62.4
Protestant/Christian	49	14.2
Buddhist	46	13.3
Eclectic	6	1.7
Others	7	2.0
No answer	22	6.4



Respondents were asked to identify on a blank space the district of Metro Manila where they reside, but many did not do so. "Chinatown" includes those who reported their residence as Binondo, Sta. Cruz, Tondo and the second district of Manila. "Manila" includes those who reported their residence as "Manila" or specific districts therein (excluding the Chinatown districts). This group may therefore include Chinatown residents. This oversight has unintentionally caused an overlap in classification.



**Table 7 PLACE OF RESIDENCE**


Metro Manila excluding Manila/Chinatown	149	43.1
Chinatown (CT) area	50	14.4
Manila (may include CT)	48	13.9
No Answer	99	28.6

"Metro Manila" refers to those of the National Capital Region other than those included in "Chinatown" and "Manila". Excluding the extraordinarily large percentage of "no answer", 20 percent of the sample reported Chinatown residence, 20.4 percent Manila, and the majority or 60 percent lived in other areas of Metro Manila.

From Table 8 it appears that the Chinese school has continued to be accorded importance as possibly the last bastion of the traditional Chinese culture. The Filipinized Chinese school, which in many ways represents a compromise between the desire to preserve a Chinese cultural identity and the need to develop more "mainstream" values and attitudes, also attracts a more significant number than Filipino schools.

**Table 8 TYPE OF EDUCATION**

Chinese-educated	207	59.8
Filipinized Chinese school	44	12.7
Filipino school	38	11.0
No Answer	57	16.5



The large number of college graduates reflects the high premium attached to education as the key to upward social mobility.

**Table 9 HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT**

Graduate/Postgraduate/M.D.	24	6.9%
College graduate	173	50.0%
Some college	36	10.4%
Vocational	2	0.6%
High school graduate	52	15.0%
Some high school	16	4.6%
Elementary graduate	1	0.3%
No answer	42	12.2%

Respondents were asked to list three languages they could best understand, read and speak. English, Fookienese and Filipino emerged as the top languages, followed by Mandarin, Cantonese and Pilipino. (See Table 10.)




Table 10 LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

	(number of respondents)				
	E	F	P	M	C
<b>Language best:</b>					
understood	127	111	90	8	1
read	164	73	82	10	1
spoken	114	108	99	10	2
<b>Language least:</b>					
understood	62	124	100	5	1
read	36	109	59	7	1
spoken	64	104	82	7	-


Note: E-English; F-Fookien; P-Pilipino; M- Mandarin; C- Cantonese

English was cited by most respondents as the language best understood (36.7 percent), best read (47.4 percent) and best spoken (32.9 percent). Fookien followed English closely in comprehension (32.1 percent) and speaking proficiency (31.2 percent). In reading skills, however, both Pilipino and Fookien lagged far behind English. Significantly, more people claimed proficiency in reading Pilipino than in reading Fookien or any other Chinese language.

It is also worth noting that of the 346 Chinese respondents, only 28 or eight percent chose to answer the Chinese version of the questionnaire. This may be seen as a problem of reading and writing proficiency, and may indicate some failure in language training on the part of Chinese schools and the community as a whole.

Table 11 OCCUPATION

Business	79	22.8%
Professionals	39	11.3%
Employees	58	16.8%
Students	60	17.3%
Housewives	41	11.8%
Others	11	3.2%
No Answer	58	16.8%



While business people represent the biggest group, they constitute only 22.8 percent of the respondents (27.4 percent excluding No Answers). In terms of age group, 15 percent of the 18-30 bracket reported business as their occupation, compared to 35 percent for the 31-45 year olds and 13 percent of the 46-65 age bracket.

The high percentage of housewives and students can be explained by the fact that they usually are assigned the function of responding to surveys distributed by or through schools.

Table 12 shows the income profile. As a general rule, incomes are not accurately reported for purposes of minimizing tax payments. This is as true for Filipinos as it is for the Chinese, but Chinese are more frequently accused of big-time tax evasion because many of them are owners of business establishments whose incomes are more difficult to keep track of. Also, as an alien minority they are easy prey to corrupt revenue officials.

Even allowing for some understatement, the income figures tend to question certain stereotypes: the Filipino image of all Chinese being rich, and the perception of most Chinese that they have a large middle-class, with less than 10 percent of them qualifying as "poor", as McBeath noted.

Income Level (in thousand pesos)




Table 12 ANNUAL FAMILY INCOME LEVEL

below 50T	80	23.1
50-100T	53	15.3
100T-200T	46	13.3
200-300T	21	6.1
300-400T	17	4.9
400-500T	15	4.4
500-1,000T	28	8.1
over 1,000T	33	9.5
No Answer	53	15.3

Note: T-thousand pesos

### LOCALISM AND COSMOPOLITANISM

In this and subsequent sections, we shall present data sets which will provide the following information: (1) trends and tendencies in ethnic Chinese political attitudes; and (2) explanatory factors in ethnic Chinese attitudes and behavior patterns.



To sum up our objectives again, we look at the following attributes as possibly illustrative of the extent of political integration of the Metro Manila Chinese; how cosmopolitan are the Metro Manila Chinese; are they well-informed in affairs of government; do they have a strong sense of duty as Filipino citizens; do they believe the political system is responsive to demands and pressures they may exert; and what is the extent of their participation in the political system.

#### DEFINITION OF LOCALIST-COSMOPOLITAN SCALE

Are the Chinese in Metro Manila oriented towards nation as a larger community, or are they more "local"-oriented? For purposes of this study, localists are defined as persons whose scale of social experience is limited, whose primary interests and involvement are in local (community or clan-based) rather than in national and international affairs, and who perceive themselves primarily as members of a local community rather than of larger social organizations. Cosmopolitans are the opposite.

In previous surveys of cosmopolitanism not pertaining to ethnic minorities (cited in Robinson), it was found that people who score as cosmopolitans tend to be more politically aware and interested in political issues. Education and occupation were more related to cosmopolitanism than either age or income. Leaders also tend to be more localist than their constituents.

The relevant questions in our survey of local-cosmopolitan attitudes are meant to assess two things; the level of interest in local compared to national affairs; and the strength of identification with the local community.

#### INTEREST IN NATIONAL VS LOCAL AFFAIRS

As far as interest in national affairs is concerned, the results show that high percentage of respondents (93.9 percent) feel that national events are important. A smaller, but nevertheless significant, number likewise believe that policies at the national level affect their daily lives (80.6 percent). Most Chinese consider themselves well-informed on national events (75.4 percent of respondents). But only slightly more than half of the respondents take time out to monitor national events at the national level (57.8 percent).

Nevertheless, when asked whether events in the local community are more interesting than national events, nearly half felt that indeed they

were (47.9 percent). A significantly lower percentage (34.7 percent) believe that national events were more interesting.

#### MEMBERSHIP IN NATIONAL VS LOCAL CLUBS

Nearly two-thirds of the respondents (61.2 percent) felt that membership in smaller, local clubs is more rewarding than that in larger, nationwide organizations. Related to this, only 33.2 percent feel that personal contacts from outside the community are more important than those within the community, with 51.7 percent saying otherwise. While having a fairly subjective interest in national affairs, the respondents tend to value local relationships as more important.

Many Chinese say that businessmen have too much influence in the community (58.6 percent) reflecting the dominant role the latter tend to play in the Chinese community.

Table 13

#### COSMOPOLITANISM

	Agree	Dis-agree	Don't know	No Answer
Personal contacts with people outside the community are more important than with inside.	33.2	51.7	13.0	2.0
I would consider moving to another country given the chance.	50.2	34.1	13.9	2.0
The policies of the national government have a great effect on my daily life.	80.6	8.1	9.5	1.7
I consider national events to be more important.	93.9	0.6	4.6	0.9
I keep informed of the affairs of national government most of the time.	75.4	6.7	16.8	1.2
Events that occur in the local community are more interesting than national events.	47.9	34.7	15.9	1.4
I feel that I belong to a community.	81.5	6.1	9.8	2.6
Membership in smaller local clubs is more rewarding than nationwide organizations.	61.2	17.9	19.2	1.7

### SENSE OF BELONGING

Some survey questions also tried to determine the strength of the respondents' sense of belonging or identification with the local community as against the nation. Asked whether they felt they belonged to a community (other than the nation) 81.5 percent of respondents said they agreed (or strongly agreed). To help us understand more fully the strength of this sense of identification with a "community", we look at what respondents actually consider as their community. These are shown in Table 14.

	Percent of sample total All respondents	Chinatown residents
"where I live"	58.4	64
"where I work"	13.9	8
"my church or where I worship"	6.1	10
ethnic/cultural group	13.0	16
others	4.0	2
no answer	4.6	0

It appears significant that only 13 percent of respondents defined "ethnic group" as their community. While a certain degree of localism is apparent among the respondents, this is not at all "ethno-centric" for the majority.

Fifty percent of the respondents said they would consider moving to another country "given the chance". A smaller percentage (35 percent) said they would not consider it.

Generally, the Chinese seem to display less attachment to the national community and a somewhat strong sense of localism, although there is also fairly high interest in and knowledge of national affairs among them.

### FACTORS RELATING TO LOCALISM AMONG CHINESE

In the cosmopolitanism measures, the mean score for the entire sample was 25.26. By establishing the mean for the different groups, categorized by age, education, residence, citizenship, education and income, we can come up with a profile of who among the Chinese would tend to be less cosmopolitan and who would tend to be more cosmopoli-

tan. These would then be interpreted as the factors that deter cosmopolitanism and those that foster cosmopolitanism. Those that foster cosmopolitanism by our definition also aid political integration.

Our initial hypothesis is that cosmopolitanism will be higher among the Chinese who are young or in their prime years (because having grown up in the Philippines, they identify less with the ethnic community), the Filipino-educated (assuming that Chinese schools perpetuate localist ethnocentric culture), and the non-Chinatown residents (who have more contact with Filipinos). High-income groups and business and professional types, whose economic lifeline is linked more to the mainstream than to the Chinese community, are also expected to be more cosmopolitan, as are Filipino citizens compared to those who remain Chinese citizens.

Our findings agree with only some of these.

The middle aged group (31-46 yrs.) has the most cosmopolitan members ( $\bar{x} = 25.89$ ), followed by the younger group (18-30 yrs.,  $\bar{x} = 25.65$ ) and then only the oldest group (46-65 yrs.,  $\bar{x} = 23.81$ ).

We isolated the responses of Chinatown residents to find out how living in the hub of the Filipino Chinese community reinforces localism. It was found that those who live in Chinatown have lower scores on cosmopolitanism ( $\bar{x} = 24.58$ ), while those who live in areas outside of Manila proper (i.e. Quezon City, San Juan, etc.) have higher scores ( $\bar{x} = 26.08$ ). The percentage of Chinatown residents who define their "community" as the neighborhood where they live is higher than that of the Chinese sample as a whole (64 percent of Chinatown residents, 58.4 percent of entire sample). Likewise, slightly more among the Chinatown residents identified ethnic group (16 percent compared to 13 percent) as their community.

[Related to this, a scale measuring satisfaction with community affairs was also employed, revealing that Chinatown residents are somewhat less satisfied with the way the community is run compared to others. Specifically, 60 percent of Chinatown residents said they would not hesitate to move to another community compared to 56.2 percent of Manila residents and 47.7 percent of residents of other Metro Manila areas. Nearly two-thirds (64 percent) of the Chinatown residents surveyed felt businessmen had too much influence in their community, compared to 56.3 percent of Manila residents and 55.7 percent of those of other areas. Sixty percent of Chinatown residents, vis-a-vis 56.4 percent of Manila and 65.5 percent

of those of other areas, felt the ordinary citizens doesn't have much say about how things are run in the community.]

Chinese who were educated in Filipinized-Chinese schools had the highest cosmopolitanism scores ( $\bar{x} = 27.13$ ), followed by those who had a traditional Chinese education ( $\bar{x} = 25.26$ ). Surprisingly, the minority who attended the Filipino schools scored the lowest in cosmopolitanism ( $\bar{x} = 24.97$ ). This may be taken to mean that a Filipino education, presumably giving more emphasis to Philippine history, society and civics, does not provide any more encouragement to cosmopolitanism, or identification with nation vis-a-vis community, than might be expected in comparison to traditional or Filipinized Chinese schools. It also shows that the Filipinized-Chinese schools, in this case Xavier and Immaculate Conception Academy, help ethnic Chinese transcend localist tendencies.

By occupational groups, the highest scores belonged to a small group classified as "others" ( $\bar{x} = 27.18$ ). In our sample these were individuals who are self-employed (e.g. insurance agents, artists, domestics). These were followed by employees ( $\bar{x} = 26.48$ ) and business persons ( $\bar{x} = 25.79$ ). Professionals, housewives and students scored below the mean for the total sample.

Higher income groups, however, tended to be more cosmopolitan, with the four highest income groups having the highest means.

Constructing a profile of the most cosmopolitan Chinese in Metro Manila, we come up with an individual who belongs to the middle age (31-46) or younger age (18-30) bracket. He or she is most likely a resident of a middle-class or upper-class subdivision outside downtown Manila, although the business address might well be in Chinatown. He or she is a Filipino citizen, most likely educated in a Filipinized Chinese school (Catholic) but also probably having spent some years in a traditional Chinese school. He is either born into relative wealth or has come into his own, and therefore enjoys fairly secure income as a self-employed person, an employee (possibly helping to manage a family firm) or business manager.

In contrast, the least cosmopolitan or more localist Chinese might be a person more senior in age, perhaps a first-generation immigrant, confined in his regular activities to the Chinatown community, with little Chinese education or no education at all, belonging to a lower income class and having remained a Chinese citizen all these years. On the other hand, she might also be a housewife or a professional educated in either

Filipino schools or traditional Chinese schools (or a combination of both) and belonging to a low-income household. Students, by virtue of their youth and inexperience, are also highly localist in orientation.

#### POLITICAL INFORMATION AND ISSUE PARTISANSHIP

This section explores the level of information and knowledge of contemporary Philippine politics, as well as familiarity with issues of the day among the ethnic Chinese in Metro Manila.

In the preceding section, we already established some relation between ethnicity and the levels of information and interest in national events. The questions in our survey that more specifically try to define and measure this relation focus largely on the attention given by respondents to the 1992 elections and to the issues current during that period. Respondents are indirectly asked if they feel they understand national issues, if they paid much attention to election campaigns, if they discussed election or related political issues with family, friends or associates and whether or not they could name candidates for the key positions at the national level.

#### LEVELS OF INFORMATION

Generally, a big percentage of the ethnic Chinese respondents demonstrated high levels of information and interest in Philippine politics, particularly the May 1992 elections.

An overwhelming majority (82.1 percent) of respondents claimed to have monitored media coverage of election-related activities. Eighty percent said they could name all the candidates for president and vice-president. An equal percentage said they could name at least 10 senatorial candidates. Nearly two-thirds (65 percent) said they paid much attention to election campaigns.

However, a smaller proportion (67.3 percent) claimed they understood national issues. Asked to comment on the statement that "Sometimes, politics and government seem so complicated I don't understand what's going on", more than half (68.2 percent) agreed or strongly agreed.

While as individuals the ethnic Chinese showed much interest in election-related activities and were well-informed about the May 1992 elections, the elections did not seem to dominate their social activity. Only 55.6 percent of Chinese discussed election issues with friends "often" and "quite often" and slightly less (50.6 percent) discussed these with family.

Table 15 POLITICAL INFORMATION

	Agree	Disagree	Don't know	No Answer
I understand national issues fairly well.	67.3	9.8	20.8	2.0
Politics and government seem so complicated that sometimes I don't understand them.	68.2	19.5	10.4	0.9
I monitored media coverage of election activities.	82.1	11.6	5.8	0.6
I can name at least 10 senatorial candidates of the 1992 race	80.1	9.0	10.1	0.9
	Often	Sometimes	Never	No Answer
I discussed election issues with friends and colleagues.	55.8	36.7	6.4	1.2
I discussed election issues with family and clan members.	50.6	40.2	7.8	1.4
My club or organization discusses political issues formally or informally.	27.7	32.1	26.9	13.3

An even smaller percentage (27.7 percent) discussed public issues formally or informally in their club or association.

### POSITIONS ON SELECTED POLICY ISSUES

Respondents were also asked to agree or disagree to statements expressing partisan positions on selected key issues of the day. A high percentage of "strongly agree" or "strongly disagree" responses may not necessarily mean more information or better understanding of the subject. But it does indicate that such an issue has made more impact on the respondents' consciousness. In this sense it is an interesting and revealing albeit limited measure of ideology and political values.

The concern over labor union activity may be partly explained by the fact that many of our Chinese are in business or management so that while the respondents may not themselves be engaged in business; they might have internalized the perceptions of this influential sector. On these issues it appears that the Chinese tends to take a conservative stance.

Table 16 ISSUE PERCEPTIONS

	Agree	Disagree	Don't know	No Answer
Electric power generation should be privatized.	57.2	29.8	11.0	2.0
Graft and corruption increased during the Aquino government.	59.8	23.1	16.2	0.9
Military solution is the best way to defeat communist insurgency.	37.6	34.7	24.2	1.7
Public school teachers dismissed for staging protests should be re-instated.	62.4	20.5	15.6	1.4
Government should see to it that labor unions do not have much influence over the economy.	72.2	14.2	13.6	-
The Senate should not have voted to close down the US bases.	67.7	19.7	11.3	1.4
The Philippine government should upgrade ties with Taiwan even if the PROC is offended.	48.9	23.4	27.2	0.5

What some might find surprising is that the biggest number of "Don't know" responses (27.02 percent) regarding the policy option of upgrading ties with Taiwan, if necessary at the expense of our ties with the People's Republic of China. This may mean: (1) lack of information on the subject, (2) lack of interest, or (3) both.

The response tends to confirm observations among some local Chinese groups that most ethnic Chinese Filipinos have little or no subjective identification with either Taiwan or the People's Republic of China. But this may not be the case for the influential minority that dominates the local Chinese community.

### CONCEPT OF GOOD GOVERNMENT

Respondents were asked to name the three problems in Philippine society they would give immediate attention to if they were in government. As the question was open-ended, there was a wide range of responses which were later categorized into eight problem-areas: poverty/social injustice; inadequate social services; poor economic/business situ-

ation; corruption/bad governance; breakdown in public order and security; breakdown in social values/mores; issues in environment, science and technology; and problems in foreign relations. The respondents rated the following as the top four problems:

- inadequate social services (24%)
- breakdown in public order (21%)
- bad state of the economy and business (20%)
- bad governance/graft and corruption (18%)

The Chinese showed more concern about the breakdown in public order and security than in the poor state of the economy and business. This is best explained by the high incidence of kidnappings-for-ransom of mainly Chinese victims involving men in uniform as masterminds, protectors or executors of these crimes.

Asked in a multiple-choice question what they would consider as the three most important characteristics of good government, the Chinese replied "strong", "honest", and "just" in this order, followed by "democratic", "stable", and "able to unify different groups". Other qualities such as "pro-poor" or "nationalist" came in last.

Respondents were also asked to identify the person they considered most qualified to be President of the Philippines. The responses are presented in Table 17. The choice of Ramos, Santiago and Cojuangco seems consistent with the ethnic Chinese concerns about peace and order, the fight against corruption and economic recovery.

#### FACTORS RELATING TO LEVEL OF POLITICAL INFORMATION

In the political information scale, the mean score for all ethnic Chinese respondents was 28.42. Looking at the age factor, we discovered that the middle age group had the highest scores on the political information scale (28.91), followed by the 18-30 age group (28.34) and finally the 46-65 bracket (28.07). Our survey of cosmopolitanism showed a similar pattern, thus validating the earlier mentioned findings cited in Robinson relating cosmopolitanism with high levels of information.

The Chinatown residents displayed the lowest scores on level of information ( $\bar{X} = 28.3$ ), while those residing in areas outside of Chinatown and Manila proper scored a high mean of 29.59.

Table 17 CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT

	(percent of sample total)
Fidel V. Ramos	56
Miriam Santiago	18
Eduardo Cojuangco	14
Jovito Salonga	8
Salvador Laurel	2
Ramon Mitra	2
Imelda Marcos	1

Filipino citizens scored a mean of 28.72, as against those who remain Chinese citizens (26.72).

Again, it was the respondents who had been educated in Filipinized Chinese schools who had the best scores for information ( $\bar{X} = 31.77$ ), followed by those from Filipino schools (29.34) and finally from traditional Chinese schools (28.03).

In terms of occupation, business people, employees, housewives and students - in that order - scored above the mean for the total sample, while professionals and "others" scored lowest. This differs sharply from the cosmopolitanism scores of these groups, and therefore appears ambiguous as regards to the claims cited in Robinson of a high correlation between occupation and levels of cosmopolitanism/information. The highest income groups scored highest in information scores, with those earning over one million pesos having the highest mean score of 32.66.

Based on the above-mentioned findings, the Chinese who was better-informed and more aware of the political situation in the Philippines, particularly with respect to election issues around May 1992, was likely to have a similar profile as the "cosmopolitan" Chinese. A Filipino citizen, he would be middle-aged to young, educated in a Catholic Filipinized-Chinese school, residing outside Chinatown, enjoying a comfortable income, and likely to be engaged in business or otherwise employed (possibly, in a family-owned firm).

#### THE CHINESE AS FILIPINO CITIZEN

Each section in the survey discusses the citizenship factor and how it affects cosmopolitanism, level of information and awareness, sense of political efficacy and the extent of political participation. One part of

the survey specifically tries to determine the extent to which the ethnic Chinese who are or have become Filipino citizens (285 out of the 346) take their citizenship seriously.

In the survey, sense of citizenship duty is indicated by the respondent's belief that the ordinary person should vote during the elections, be prepared to take action in response to perceived injustices, try to influence policy when deemed necessary, and in general be civic-minded enough to play a part in the management of his community. We also asked respondents whether they felt they had an obligation to do something for the country, whether or not such activity is perceived effective.

A strong sense of citizenship duty, however, for people in general but for the Chinese in particular, may not necessarily be attributable to patriotism or to a Filipino national identity, but possibly to other motive forces, including cultural encouragement of strong civic-mindedness as a virtue or, in some instances, even self-interest.

#### SENSE OF CITIZENSHIP DUTY

Do people have an obligation to do something for the country? Almost all respondents (93.3 percent) replied in the affirmative. However, only 33.3 percent "strongly agreed" with this statement.

Table 18 CITIZENSHIP DUTY

	Agree	Dis-agree	Don't know	No Answer
People have an obligation to do something for the country.	93.3	1.4	3.9	1.4
I voted because it is my duty.	89.5	4.3	4.2	2.0
I would probably do something about government moves to pass a law I think is harmful.	53.0	6.4	35.8	4.9
Ordinary people should try to influence national policy.	78.2	5.6	13.3	2.8
Ordinary people should play a part in the affairs of their local community.	82.8	3.2	12.3	1.8
It isn't so important to vote if you know your candidate has no chance of winning.	14.4	76.8	7.0	1.8

Should the ordinary person try to influence national policy? Again, a clear majority (78.2 percent) said yes while 82.8 percent agreed that one should take part in local community affairs.

Asked if they would "do something" if government were considering passing a law that they felt was unjust and harmful to society, 53 percent said they probably would compared with six percent who said they would not.

What exactly would they consider doing? Most Chinese did not give specific answers. Among those who did reply, most (43 percent of responses) said they would write about the problem using media (e.g. letters to the editor, open letters to public officials concerned). Others said they would "complain" or "protest" in an unspecified manner (14 percent), lobby with the Philippine Congress (10 percent) and join organized mass actions (nine percent).

To the statement "I voted because it is my duty", 89.5 percent of respondents concurred. Consistent with this response, 76.8 percent disagreed with the statement "It isn't so important to vote if you know your candidate doesn't stand a chance of winning." The right to vote, then, appears to be valued by the ethnic Chinese.

Even allowing for some exaggeration on the part of respondents regarding their sense of duty as citizens (since society demands its citizens to fulfill certain duties), the respondents demonstrated a high sense of civic responsibility. But they had difficulty translating this into concrete terms and actions.

#### FACTORS AFFECTING SENSE OF CITIZENSHIP DUTY

The Filipino citizens among the ethnic Chinese were further observed in terms of how age, domicile, income, occupation and education may relate to their responses. The mean score for sense of citizenship duty among them was 27.11.

Analyzed by age, the 31-45 age group had the highest sense of duty ( $\bar{X} = 27.26$ ; S.D. = 4.87), followed by the 46-65 year old group ( $\bar{X} = 27.22$ ; S.D. = 4.12). The youngest respondent set had the lowest sense of duty ( $\bar{X} = 26.96$ ; S.D. = 5.21).

By residence, sense of duty was highest among those who lived outside the Chinatown-Manila area ( $\bar{X} = 28.07$ ; S.D. = 3.22), second highest for Chinatown residents ( $\bar{X} = 27.38$ ; S.D. = 3.65), and lowest for those who reported Manila as their area of residence ( $\bar{X} = 25.37$ ; S.D. 6.9).

By education, sense of duty was highest among those educated in Filipino schools ( $\bar{X} = 28.45$ ; S.D. = 3.55), followed closely by those who went to Filipinized Chinese schools ( $\bar{X} = 28.11$ ; S.D. = 3.35). Those from traditional Chinese schools had the lowest scores ( $\bar{X} = 27.06$ ; S.D. 4.47).

By occupation, the professionals, employees and students had the highest scores (above the mean for the total sample), while among those scoring low to lowest were business persons, "others", and housewives.

The two highest-income groups in our scale also scored highest in sense of citizenship duty, while the two lowest-income categories had the lowest sense of duty scores. Middle-income groups tended to have middle-level scores.

In summary, the ethnic Chinese who demonstrated a higher sense of citizenship duty were those above 30 years old, residents of Metro Manila (areas outside Chinatown-Manila proper), those educated in a Filipino or Filipinized Chinese academy, those belonging to high or upper middle income groups, and those working as professionals or employees. As a group, students also tended towards a higher sense of duty than businessmen or housewives.

The ones who had less appreciation of their duty as citizens were the very young (except possibly some students in Filipino and Filipinized Chinese schools), residents of Manila-Chinatown area, those educated in traditional Chinese schools, those belonging to lower income levels, and those in occupational categories of "business", "others" and "housewives".

#### SENSE OF POLITICAL EFFICACY

The political efficacy scale measures "a person's subjective competence in politics, especially with regard to one's feeling of playing an important role in telling the government how things should be run." This is as defined by the Survey Research Center, cited in Robinson, p.443. As defined by Campbell et.al., political efficacy is "the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that individual citizens can play part in bringing about this change."

Political efficacy studies of five countries by Almond and Verba in 1963 found that with education controlled, those who score high on subjective competence are more likely to expose themselves to political communication, engage in political discussion and be partisan activists. In other words, the higher one's sense of political efficacy, the higher one's level of participation.

Table 19

## POLITICAL EFFICACY

	Agree	Dis-agree	Don't know	No Answer
People like me don't have any say about what government does.	37.0	41.4	17.6	4.0
When I go to a government agency, I feel I am treated the same as everyone else.	42.5	39.3	14.5	3.8
If the government were to pass a law harmful to my family/business I would probably act.	61.9	7.2	25.1	5.8
After I voted (in May 1992), I had a feeling of satisfaction.	59.8	13.8	19.9	6.4
I felt casting my ballot was a waste of time.	13.3	65.6	15.6	6.4
Voting is the only way people like me have a say in the way things are run.	64.2	18.2	12.7	4.9
I am satisfied with the results I get when dealing with government offices.	21.7	51.2	23.1	4.0
People in government usually pay little attention to what the people really need.	79.8	10.1	7.8	2.3
Differences of race are important considerations in Philippine politics.	51.5	30.6	15.0	2.9
Differences of income and class are important considerations in politics.	67.1	19.0	11.6	2.3

Detailed below are the findings on Metro Manila Chinese' sense of political efficacy.

More than half (61.9 percent) of the respondents said they would probably do something about it if government considered passing a law that would hurt their family or business interests. Twenty-five percent said they "don't know" what they would do if this situation arose.

With regard to the elections that had just taken place before the administration of the survey, 59.8 percent of the respondents claimed they felt satisfied after voting. A minority (13.8 percent) claimed dissatisfaction, while 20 percent said they did not know what to feel.

On another question, only 13.3 percent indicated that they felt casting a ballot was a waste of time, while 65.6 percent felt otherwise. About two thirds (64.2 percent) felt that voting was the only way people like them could have a say in government, with 18.2 percent disagreeing and 12.7 percent answering "don't know".

The findings here seem to show that a good number of the Chinese respondents believe in voting. At the same time, they appear ambiguous and unsure about their ability to influence policy other than through voting.

With regard to perceptions of government's ability to deliver the goods, 79.7 percent agreed with the statement that people in government usually pay little attention to what the people really need, with 10.1 percent disagreeing. Slightly over half (51.2 percent) are not satisfied with the results they get in dealing with government offices, compared to 21.7 percent who are satisfied. On the other hand, more feel that they are treated equally (42.5 percent) compared to those who claim they are not (39.3 percent).

Respondents were also asked about their perception on the role of race and class in Philippine politics. More than half (51.5 percent) felt race was an important consideration in Philippine politics with 30.6 percent saying it was not important. However, a bigger percentage (67.1 percent) of the respondent felt that income and class are important considerations with only 19 percent saying these were not important.

Generally, then, the Chinese seem to think that income and class are far more important factors than race in Philippine politics.

Finally, only 37 percent of the Chinese would agree to the statement that "People like me don't have a say about what the government does." Less than half (41.4 percent) think they do have a say, while 17.6 percent say they "don't know".

In sum, respondents indicate dissatisfaction with government delivery (especially of fairness) but believe they do have means of influencing government, although such means are not perfect and not very clearly defined.

#### FACTOR AFFECTING SENSE OF EFFICACY

The mean score for the entire sample as far as political efficacy is concerned was 24.37.

Filipino citizens, as expected, had higher scores for efficacy than the Chinese citizens ( $\bar{X} = 24.69$ , compared to 23.58).

Among the respondents, those aged 46-65 had the highest efficacy scores ( $\bar{X} = 25.1$ ; S.D. = 4.99), followed by the middle aged group ( $\bar{X} = 24.38$ ; S.D. = 4.32) and the young respondents ( $\bar{X} = 24.35$ ; S.D. 5.7).

By residence, those who lived outside the Chinatown-Manila area scored considerably higher ( $\bar{X} = 25.12$ ; S.D. 4.07) than Chinatown residents ( $\bar{X} = 24.48$ ; S.D. = 4.48) and Manila residents ( $\bar{X} = 23.68$ ; S.D. = 6.12).

By education, respondents who were educated in Filipinized Chinese schools had a higher sense of efficacy ( $\bar{X} = 26.08$ ; S.D. = 4.05) than those who went to Filipino schools ( $\bar{X} = 25.31$ ; S.D. = 4.53) and to traditional Chinese schools ( $\bar{X} = 24.19$ ; S.D. = 5.06).

Employees, students, housewives and business persons had higher scores - in that order - other than those in the categories of "others" and "professionals". It also appeared that the higher one's income, the higher also is one's sense of political efficacy. Conversely, the lower one's income, the lower the sense of efficacy.

In summary, the politically efficacious ethnic Chinese Filipino is probably a Filipino citizen, mostly above 45 years old but could also be aged 30 to 45, and residing outside Chinatown or Manila. He has been educated in Filipinized Chinese or Filipino school, rather than in a traditional Chinese school. He belongs to the higher income brackets. In terms of occupation, however, employees, students and housewives seem to have better efficacy ratings than business persons, professionals and "others".

People who are younger tend to be less efficacious than older persons, and Chinatown-Manila residents less so compared to their counterparts from, for example, Quezon City or San Juan. Lower-income individuals and those educated in traditional Chinese schools tend to be less efficacious, as do professionals.

#### POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Unlike previous sections which have thus far focused on attitudinal characteristic of the ethnic Chinese, the current section deals with their actual political behavior.

The political participation of individuals in liberal-democratic systems such as the Philippines is usually delineated along specific cat-



egories. These range from "passiveness" or non activity, to "soft" participation (e.g., political discussions, voting, campaigning privately, giving financial support to officials or candidates), and the "harder" forms of political participation such as active lobbying, membership in overtly political organizations, seeking candidacy for public office or actually serving in government.

Table 20

## POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

	Yes	No	No Answer
I belong to an organization that sometimes take a stand on public issues.	22.8	68.5	8.7
I've attended meetings at which political speeches were made.	18.5	78.3	3.2
I sometimes discuss national issues with friends.	69.7	27.5	2.9
I often try to convince others that my position on a political issue is correct.	38.4	57.2	4.3
I've written or talked to government officials about my position on a public issue.	20.2	76.9	2.9
In the last election I worked for a candidate as a campaign volunteer.	9.2	87.9	2.9
I have contributed money to a political party or candidate for public office.	10.7	86.7	2.6
I've talked to people to show them why they should vote for a particular candidate.	43.1	54.6	2.3
Many of my friends have asked me whom I was voting for.	78.6	18.5	2.9

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# THE ROLE OF YOUNG CHINESE ENTREPRENEURS IN THE PHILIPPINE ECONOMY: RENEWING TRADITION, FACING NEW CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

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OUR GENERATION OF young entrepreneurs are heirs to a rich tradition and culture from our forebears. However, it is essential that we should establish our own identity, create our own new worlds and forge our own destiny. In the 1980s and 1990s, we are witnessing the rise of a new breed of young Chinese entrepreneurs who shall most likely become the future business leaders of the 21st century. Our elders, who were either immigrants or the children of immigrants, had gallantly triumphed over all kinds of tribulations and crises in order to pave the way for a better future for the next generation. We can never forget that our forebears had overcome many problems and overwhelming odds with their high standards of strength, courage and sacrifice which we the younger generation should seek to emulate. Unlike our elders, who have been tested in adversity, our generation of young entrepreneurs still have to prove ourselves. We should cherish the heritage and wisdom of our elders, their cultural and moral values, their risk-taking and pioneering